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How CAN A PLAINTIFF PROVE INTENTIONAL
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IF SHE CANNOT
EXPLORE THE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES: THE NEED




The modem discovery process is significant in most litigation,' but argu-
ably even more so in employment discrimination litigation2 under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)', the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA),4 and the post-Civil War statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (§
1981).5
The individual disparate treatment theory based upon circumstantial evi-
dence ("Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment") is the most common
way by which an employer's discrimination is proved.6 Using this theory, the
plaintiff--either the aggrieved individual7 or the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) acting on her behalf pursuant to Title VII or the
ADEA 8-- has no direct evidence of discrimination.9 Rather the plaintiff must
* Associate Professor, Wake Forest School of Law. B.A., University of Montana, 1981;
J.D., Yale University School of Law, 1984. My thanks to Professor J. Wilson Parker, who
provided invaluable advice. Thanks also to my research assistants Neil Day, Ashton Hudson, and
Coe Ramsey.
1. Discovery allows "a party not only to narrow the issues and obtain evidence for use at
the trial, but also to discover information about where and how such evidence could be obtained."
8 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 41 (2d ed.
1994); see also United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (noting that
discovery and other pretrial procedures "make a trial less a game of blind-man's bluff and more a
fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent").
2. See infra notes 133-137 and accompanying text.
3. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
4. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
5. Section 1981 had its genesis in the Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
6. Ryther v. KARE 11, 84 F.3d 1074, 1080 n.6 (8th Cir. 1996) ("[l]ntentional discrimina-
tion will frequently be proven by circumstantial evidence ....") (citing United States Postal Serv.
Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)); see also Hollander v. American Cyana-
mid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[E]mployers rarely leave a paper trail-or 'smoking
gun'-attesting to a discriminatory intent ....").
7. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
8. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
9. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors, 460 U.S. at 716 ("There will seldom be
'eyewitness' testimony as to the employer's mental processes.").
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prove her case to the factfinder" solely through inferences of discriminat-
ion." The assessment of such circumstantial evidence is "generally speaking,
most competently and appropriately made by the trier of fact."' 2
The United States Supreme Court, in St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks,3 undoubtedly increased the quantum of circumstantial evidence re-
quired to guarantee a plaintiff's victory on a claim of Circumstantial Individu-
al Disparate Treatment. 4 Given the Hicks decision and the very nature of a
Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment claim, federal district courts 5
should exercise their discretion 6 to allow a plaintiff broad workforce and
temporal scope in the discovery process.
Part II of this article discusses the substantive law of Circumstantial Indi-
vidual Disparate Treatment. It observes that in formulating the Circumstantial
Individual Disparate Treatment theory, the United States Supreme Court as-
sumed that the plaintiff would be allowed ample discovery. The article then
considers the Hicks decision and its likely effect upon the discovery process.
Part III of the article offers an overview of the relevant discovery provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It also discusses the crucial role
of, and great discretion exercised by, district judges and magistrate judges in
the discovery process.
In Part IV, the article addresses the special discovery needs of a Circum-
stantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff, particularly as to workforce
data beyond that of the aggrieved individual herself. It also considers three
crucial types of workforce data that the plaintiff typically seeks.
Part V of the article analyzes the appropriate workforce scope of discov-
ery, concluding that the plaintiff should not be restricted to discovery within
the unit or location at which the aggrieved individual worked.
Part VI of the article similarly analyzes the appropriate temporal scope of
discovery, concluding that the plaintiff should be allowed to take discovery of
events several years prior to and after the adverse employment action at issue.
10. Jury trials have long been allowed in § 1981 litigation. Novack Inv. Co. v. Setser, 454
U.S. 1064, 1064 (1981) (noting lower courts' uniformity that § 1981 "liability should be decided
by a jury") (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). Since its enactment, the ADEA also
has allowed jury trials "of any issue of fact." 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2). According to the 1991 amen-
dments to Title VII, a plaintiff is entitled to a jury trial where she "cannot recover" under § 1981
and "seeks compensatory or punitive damages" under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 1977A(a)(1), (c)(l).
11. Hollander, 895 F.2d at 85 ("[D]isparate treatment plaintiffs often must build their cases
from pieces of circumstantial evidence which cumulatively undercut the credibility of the various
explanations offered by the employer.").
12. Id.
13. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
14. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
15. Title VII claims, ADEA claims, and § 1981 claims may be tried in state court. Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29 (1991) (noting concurrent subject-matter jurisdic-
tion over ADEA claims); Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 821 (1990) (noting
concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over Title VII claims); Keating v. Rhode Island, 785 F.
Supp. 1094, 1099 (D.R.I. 1992) (noting concurrent subject-matter jurisdiction over § 1981 claims).
However, this article focuses exclusively on the litigation of those claims in federal court under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
16. See infra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in Part VII, the article recommends that, consistent with the Cir-
cumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory and with discovery princi-
ples, district judges and magistrate judges should exercise their considerable
discretion to accord a plaintiff wide latitude in both the workforce and tempo-
ral parameters of discovery. Part VII argues that in the absence of such dis-
covery, the goals of the anti-discrimination statutes cannot be fulfilled.
II. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE
TREATMENT
The mission of the anti-discrimination statutes is "to assure equality of
employment opportunities and to eliminate... discriminatory practices and
devices."' 7 Title VII prohibits employers'" from discriminating against indi-
viduals on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The
ADEA prohibits employers" from discriminating against individuals at or
over forty years of age.' Section 1981 prohibits employers22 from discrimi-
17. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (addressing a Title VII
claim); see also 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (stating that the purpose of the ADEA includes prohibiting
"arbitrary age discrimination in employment"); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (noting that § 1981 is "directed to most of the same ends" as Title VII).
18. Title VII applies to private employers of 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
Title VII's coverage extends to federal, state, and local government employers. 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e(a), 2000e-16. Title VII also prohibits discrimination by employment agencies, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(b), and labor organizations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c), which will not be discussed in this
article.
19. Section 703(a) of Title VII protects both applicants and employees:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportu-
nities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indivi-
dual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
20. The ADEA covers employers of 20 or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).
21. Section 4(a) of the ADEA protects both applicants and employees:
It shall be unlawful for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment, because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with this Chap-
ter.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a). Section 12(a) limits the ADEA to "individuals who are at least 40 years of
age." Subsections (b) and (c) of § 4 prohibit discrimination by employment agencies and labor
organizations respectively; such discrimination is not addressed in this article. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b)
& (c).
22. Section 1981 does not address the size of an employing entity. Michael Reiss, Requiem
for An "Independent Remedy": The Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871 as Remedies for Employ-
ment Discrimination, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 961, 974 (1977) ("Section 1981 contains no statutory
minimum" but "clearly does extend its protection to millions of workers... not covered by Title
VII."). Section 1981 has applied to private employers for over two decades. Johnson v. Railway
1996]
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nating against persons on the basis of race or ethnicity.23 The EEOC may sue
on the aggrieved individual's behalf under Title VII and the ADEA,24 and the
aggrieved individual has a private right of action under all three of these anti-
discrimination statutes.
25
There are several theories by which a plaintiff can prove a violation of
one or more of these anti-discrimination statutes. The first major division is
between disparate treatment, which requires proof of intentional discrimina-
tion,26 and disparate impact, which requires proof that an employer's neutral
practice adversely affected a protected class.27 Disparate treatment is "the
most easily understood type" of discrimination, where an "employer simply
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1975). Section 1981 also applies to labor organiza-
tions, General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), and protects
various non-employment contractual interests, such as the use of recreation clubs, Olzman v. Lake
Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974).
23. Section 1981 does not use the word "race," but rather provides:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by
white citizens....
(b) For purposes of this section, the term " make and enforce contracts" includes
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment
of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)-(b) (1994).
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 1981's ban on racial discrimination broadly, to pro-
tect persons on account of ethnicity and ancestry. Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S.
604 (1987) (holding that Arabs are a protected race under § 1981); cf. Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (holding that Jews are a protected race under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a
companion statute to § 1981).
24. Section 706(f)(1) of Title VII provides that the EEOC "may bring a civil action against
any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named in the
charge," where the EEOC has attempted and failed in conciliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). The
section further provides that the Attorney General of the United States may bring suit against a
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision. Id. Section 7(b) of the ADEA similarly
provides that the EEOC may bring suit against an employer, where the EEOC has attempted and
failed in achieving the employer's voluntary compliance. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
25. Section 706(0(1) of Title VII provides that where neither the EEOC nor the Attorney
General has pursued suit against the employer, and where there is no conciliation agreement, "the
person claiming to be aggrieved" may file suit "within ninety days after" the EEOC has given
such notice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l). Section 7(e) of the ADEA similarly provides that the
"person aggrieved" may bring suit "within 90 days after the receipt of [a) notice" that the EEOC
has terminated its investigatory proceedings. 29 U.S.C. § 626(e).
Individuals must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC within a certain number of
days from the date of the adverse employment action; the time period is 180 days in a non-defer-
ral state and 300 days in a deferral state. Title VII § 706(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); ADEA
§ 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). The EEOC retains administrative jurisdiction of a Title VII charge for
a minimum of 180 days and an ADEA charge for a minimum of 60 days before the individual can
file suit. Title VII § 706(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); ADEA § 7(d), 29 U.S.C. § 626(d).
Section 1981 contains no procedures for administrative actions. Johnson, 421 U.S. at 460
("Further, it has been noted that the filing of a Title VII charge and resort to Title VII's admin-
istrative machinery are not prerequisites for the institution of a § 1981 action."); see also MARK
A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.36 (1994) ("The absence of the Title VII require-
ments of administrative exhaustion also simplifies a claim under § 1981.").
26. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993) (stating "[piroof of discriminatory
motive is critical" in cases of disparate treatment) (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)).
27. Id. (finding "[plroof of discriminatory motive is ... not required under a disparate-im-
pact theory") (quoting International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15).
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treats some people less favorably than others because of' their protected sta-
tus.28
The disparate treatment theory further divides into systemic and individual
cases. Systemic disparate treatment, also known as "pattern or practice," oc-
curs where an employer intentionally discriminates against a protected class as
a whole.2 9 Individual disparate treatment, in contrast, focuses upon the ad-
verse employment action suffered by one or a few aggrieved individuals with-
in the protected class.3" The individual disparate treatment theory further sub-
divides into cases based upon direct evidence3 and cases based upon circum-
stantial evidence; the latter are the most common, for "'[e]mployers are rarely
so cooperative as to include a notation in the personnel file' that the firing is
for a reason expressly forbidden by law."32 In relying on circumstantial evi-
dence, the plaintiff essentially proves the employer's intent "by process of
elimination.""
Although not every theory is available pursuant to every one of these
three anti-discrimination statutes,34 it is clear that the courts apply the Cir-
cumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory identically for Title VII, the
ADEA, and § 1981. 5
28. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n. 15.
29. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977) (addressing system-wide
discrimination in not hiring black teachers); International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 324
(discussing system-wide discrimination in placing blacks and Spanish-surnamed persons in less
desirable jobs).
30. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 876 (1984) (noting that "[t]he inquiry
regarding an individual's claim is the reason for a particular employment decision").
31. Where there is direct evidence of employment discrimination and the factfinder believes
the evidence, the plaintiff prevails. Where the plaintiff proves direct evidence of employment dis-
crimination and the employer proves that it would have taken the same adverse employment ac-
tion in the absence of the discrimination, a separate "mixed motive" analysis codified in Title VII
is used. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m), -5(g)(2)(B); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
274 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Although neither the ADEA nor § 1981 contains such
mixed motive language, courts have adopted the mixed motive theory in cases arising under those
statutes. E.g., Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995) (affirming
district court's decision to give a mixed motive jury instruction in ADEA case); Williams v.
Fermenta Animal Health Co., 984 F.2d 261, 265 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming district court's mixed
motive jury instruction in a Title VII and § 1981 case).
32. Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 464-65 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting
Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R. Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985)); see also
supra notes 6, 9.
33. Marzano v. Computer Sciences Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 508 (3d Cir. 1996).
34. For example, the disparate impact theory does not apply in § 1981 cases. General Bldg.
Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982) ("[S]ection 1981 can be violat-
ed only by intentional discrimination."). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has yet to recognize a
disparate impact claim brought under the ADEA. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610
(1993).
35. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 609 (stating that "[t]he disparate treatment theo-
ry is of course available under the ADEA"); Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d
1328, 1332 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996) ("Although McDonnell Douglas is a Title VII case, the framework
it establishes applies with equal force to claims under the ADEA."); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Although the ADEA was enacted by Congress as a
separate statute, we nevertheless apply the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework within the
ADEA context."); Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDon-
nel Douglas-Burdine burden shifting framework in a § 1981 case); Melendez v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 79 F.3d 661, 669 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The substantive standards governing liability for § 1981
claims and Title VII disparate treatment claims are identical."); Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, 69
19961
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In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green36 and Texas Department of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine,37 the United States Supreme Court propounded a
tripartite analysis for claims of Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment,
to fulfill the goals of the anti-discrimination law." Under this tripartite analy-
sis, the plaintiff first bears the burden of proving a prima facie case by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.39 The prima facie case typically requires the
plaintiff to prove the following four elements: that the aggrieved individual
belongs to a class protected by the relevant anti-discrimination statute; that she
was qualified for the position she sought or held; that she suffered an adverse
employment action; and that the employer continued to seek to fill the posi-
tion.' Establishing a prima facie case is "not onerous."'"
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production
shifts to the employer to articulate, through admissible evidence, a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 2 The employer
F.3d 1523, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Wle apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting frame-
work originally devised in the Title VII context [in a § 1981 case]."); Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d
1270, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("A plaintiff may establish a violation of [§ 1981] using the same
three-step framework of proof used to establish racial discrimination under Title VII."); Mitchell v.
Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The McDonnell Douglas... formula is the
evidentiary framework applicable not only to claims brought under Title VII, but also to claims
under ADEA ... and ... under 42 U.S.C. § 1981."); Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417,
1420 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The shifting burden of proof applied to a Title VII discrimination claim
also applies to claims arising under ADEA."); Johnson v. Legal Servs., Inc., 813 F.2d 893, 896
(8th Cir. 1987) ("[The Title VII framework] is used for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.").
36. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
37. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
38. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
39. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
40. Id. The McDonnel Douglas Court also noted that "[t]he facts necessarily will vary in
Title VII cases, and the specification above of the prima facie proof required from [plaintiff] is not
necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13.
Regarding the fourth element, the Supreme Court has ruled that an ADEA plaintiff need
not prove that her replacement was outside the protected class. O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 116 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (1996) ("[T]he fact that an ADEA plaintiff was replaced by
someone outside the protected class is not a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case."). The Supreme Court has made no such ruling with respect to a Title VII plaintiff. St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 528 n.1 (1993) ("This Court has not directly addressed
the question whether the personal characteristics of someone chosen to replace a Title VII plaintiff
are material, and that issue is not before us today.") (Souter, J., dissenting). Both prior and subse-
quent to O'Connor, some circuit courts found the identity of the plaintiff's replacement to be
irrelevant to the establishment of a prima facie case. E.g., Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82
F.3d 157, 158-59 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A Title VII employee] may be able to show that his race or
another characteristic that the law places off limits tipped the scales against him, without regard to
the demographic characteristics of his replacement."); Cumpiano v. Banco Santader, 902 F.2d 148,
155 (lst Cir. 1990) ("[Wle have never held that the fourth element of a prima facie discharge case
can be fulfilled only if the complainant shows that she was replaced by someone outside the pro-
tected group.").
When the adverse employment action is a workforce reduction, the plaintiff cannot prove
the fourth element of a prima facie case, for the employer does not hire any replacement. Instead,
the plaintiff often must provide additional evidence that others outside the protected class were
treated more favorably. E.g., Smith v. Cook County, 74 F.3d 829, 831 (7th Cir. 1996); Wallis v.
J.R. Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1994).
41. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
42. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
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need not persuade the trier of fact, but simply must "raise[] a genuine issue of
fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff."43
Third, if the employer carries its intermediate burden of production, the
plaintiff is afforded "a full and fair opportunity"" to prove, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for
discrimination.45 For over twenty years, the Burdine Court's description of
pretext guided the lower courts:
[The plaintiff] now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirect-
ly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy
of credence.'
Thus, the burden of proof in a Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treat-
ment case remains at all times upon the plaintiff.47 The Burdine Court be-
lieved that its allocation of proof and production would not "unduly hinder the
plaintiff' for several reasons, one of which was based upon the plaintiff's
opportunity to conduct discovery:
[T]he liberal discovery rules applicable to any civil suit in federal
court are supplemented in a Title VII suit by the plaintiff's access to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's investigatory files
concerning her complaint. Given these factors, we are unpersuaded
that the plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a prof-
fered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We remain con-
fident that the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the plaintiff
meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.'
In 1993, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks49 a bare majority of the
Court, purportedly relying on United States Postal Service Board of Governors
v. Aikens,5" increased the plaintiff's burden of proving pretext by holding that
Burdine's "or" language was dicta." The Hicks Court stated:
43. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
44. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 805; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
45. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
46. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 258 (citation omitted). Interestingly, years later in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989), the Supreme Court reiterated its view of employment discrimi-
nation discovery to justify increasing the plaintiff's burden in a disparate impact case: "Some will
complain that this specific causation requirement is unduly burdensome on Title VII plaintiffs. But
liberal civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers' records in an effort to docu-
ment their claims." Id.
49. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
50. 460 U.S. 711, 714 (1983) (quoting Burdine's "or" language for proof of pretext, but
describing the ultimate issue as "discrimination vel non").
51. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515.
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Title VII does not award damages against employers who cannot
prove a nondiscriminatory reason for adverse employment action, but
only against employers who are proven to have taken adverse em-
ployment action by reason of [protected status]. That the employer's
proffered reason is unpersuasive, or even obviously contrived, does
not necessarily establish that the plaintiff's proffered reason ... is
correct.
52
It is certain from the above language that the Hicks Court rejected a pure
"pretext-only" definition previously adopted by some circuit courts." Under
the pure "pretext-only" approach, the plaintiff's discrediting of the employer's
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was the "equivalent to a finding that the
employer intentionally discriminated" against the plaintiff.54
It is less certain, however, what alternate definition of pretext the Court
did adopt, and lower courts are struggling to interpret and apply the Hicks
decision." Indeed, two circuit courts have required en banc review to deter-
mine the current definition of pretext.56
The Hicks language quoted above might be viewed as adopting a strict
"pretext-plus" approach, which would require "both a showing that the
employer's reasons are false and direct evidence that the employer's real rea-
sons were discriminatory."" Justice Souter's dissent in Hicks interprets the
decision in precisely that way: "The majority's chosen method of proving
52. Id. at 523-24.
53. E.g Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1334 ("The [Hicks] Court thus rejected the pretext-only posi-
tion."); Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079, 1086 (6th Cir. 1996) (affirming district
court's grant of summary judgment for employer and rejecting plaintiff's argument that under
Hicks she could "prevail ... simply by discrediting the defendant's articulated non-discriminatory
reasons"); Felker v. Pepsi-Cola Co., No. 95-9012, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 5836, at *5 (2d Cir.
Mar. 28, 1996) (affirming judgment for employer because under Hicks, "[tlhe District Court, as
the finder of fact, was permitted to accept the premise that reasons other than those articulated by
defendant were the basis of the discharge, but nevertheless finding in favor of defendants on the
ultimate question of whether plaintiff proved discrimination"); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th Cir. 1994) ("The [Hicks] Court "rejected the 'pretext only'
position."); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1994) ("It is clear
that the Court rejected the 'pretext-only' rule."). See also Hicks, 509 U.S. at 512-13, for a discus-
sion of the previous split among the circuit courts.
54. Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir. 1984).
55. E.g. Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (finding
it "unclear" whether the Court "intended that in all such cases in which an inference of discrimi-
nation is permitted a verdict of discrimination is necessarily supported by sufficient evidence");
Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (finding it is "less clear" as to whether the court adopted the "pretext-
only" rule or the "pretext-plus" rule). The Second Circuit, however, deems any confusion over
Hicks "ill-founded." Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1164 (1994).
56. Sheridan v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc);
Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 993.
57. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123 (emphasis added). Judge Joseph E. Irenas of the United States
District Court for the District of New Jersey is reported to have determined that the quoted "pas-
sage gave rise to the pretext-plus approach that proof that the defendant's proffered reason is
wrong is insufficient for a plaintiff to avoid summary judgment for the defendant and additional
evidence is needed to support a finding of discriminatory animus." Discrimination: Courts Strug-
gle with Summary Judgment in Disparate Treatment Cases, Judge Says, 1996 Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 45, at D-32 (Mar. 7, 1996) [hereinafter Courts Struggle].
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'pretext for discrimination' changes Burdine's 'either ... or' into a 'both...
and."' 58 However, the Seventh Circuit treats the above Hicks language as dic-
ta, just as the Hicks Court considered Burdine's "or" language as dicta."
The Hicks opinion also contains more moderate language regarding the
plaintiff's burden of proving pretext for discrimination:
[T]he trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether
plaintiff has proven "that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against [him]" because of his race. The factfinder's disbelief of the
reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is ac-
companied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the ele-
ments of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimina-
tion. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons, will permit
the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimina-
tion .... But the Court of Appeals' holding that rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons compels judgment for the plaintiff dis-
regards the fundamental principle of Rule 301 that a presumption
does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores our repeated admoni-
tion that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the "ultimate burden
of persuasion. '"60
In light of this more moderate language, some lower courts have found that
Hicks created a "modified pretext-only" standard: "[Ihf the employer offers a
pretext-a phony reason-for why it fired the employee, then the trier of fact
is permitted, although not compelled, to infer that the real reason was [the
employee's membership in a protected class]."' The EEOC also has inter-
preted the Hicks decision in this manner.62
58. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 531 n.7.
59. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124 n.3. The Anderson court stated:
As the dissent in Hicks points out, there is language in the Court's opinion that could
support a finding that additional evidence of discrimination besides establishment of a
prima facie case and rejection of the employer's proffered reasons for the plaintiff's
discharge is required to prove intentional discrimination. However, such language is
dicta. In rejecting application of this language, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's
admonishment that it is "generally undesirable, where holdings of the Court are not at
issue to dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as though they were the Unit-
ed States Code."
td. (quoting Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515).
60. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Surprisingly, Judge
Joseph E. Irenas of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, is quoted as
finding this language to be "the basis of the pretext-only approach." Courts Struggle, supra note
57.
61. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123. Furthermore, "it appears that the [Hicks] Court adopted this
circuit's version of the 'pretext-only' rule." Id.; see also Rothmeier, 85 F.3d at 1328 ("The [Hicks]
Court, however, also rejected the pretext-plus position."); Dickens v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., No.
94-2494, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 3853, at *8 (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996) ("The plaintiff, at all times,
retains the burden of proving intentional discrimination, which may be accomplished by showing
that the reasons proffered by the employer for its actions are pretextual."); Randle v. City of Auro-
ra, 69 F.3d 441, 451 (10th Cir. 1995) ("[Al showing of pretext is evidence which allows a jury to
infer discriminatory intent."); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1083 (6th
Cir. 1994) (finding that the Hicks Court "also rejected the 'pretext plus' position").
62. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 1994 Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 70, at D2 (April 12, 1994) ("In most cases, before and after Hicks, if the evi-
dence shows that the respondent's articulated reasons are untrue, it can be assumed that the em-
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Whether Hicks is read as adopting a "pretext-plus" approach or as adopt-
ing a "modified pretext-only" approach, it is beyond doubt that the decision
increased the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving pretext from the burden
explained in Burdine.63 Until Hicks is modified by the Court or is legislative-
ly overruled,64 a "plaintiff might be well advised to present additional evi-
dence of discrimination, because the factfinder is not required to find in her
favor simply because she establishes a prima facie case and shows that the
employer's proffered reasons are false."
The Hicks definition of pretext undoubtedly makes the plaintiff's discov-
ery process more important, especially to survive the employer's virtually
inevitable motion for summary judgment.' Management lawyers, citing
Hicks, will argue that "a plaintiff cannot defeat an employer's motion for sum-
mary judgment simply by stating a prima facie case[,]" and that "if a plaintiff
can produce no evidence beyond a bare prima facie case and a subjective be-
ployer is trying to cover up discrimination, and hence, that a finding of 'cause' is appropriate.
Although Hicks clearly holds that a showing that an employer's articulated reason is untrue does
not compel a finding of liability, it is also clear that such a finding is permitted.").
63. Christopher R. Hedican & Timothy D. Loudon, The 1993 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: Their Anticipated Impact on Employment Litigation, 28 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 997, 1015 (June 1995) [hereinafter Hedican & Loudon] ("After the Supreme Court's recent
ruling in Hicks, the plaintiff now arguably has a heavier burden in establishing pretext in order to
prove a claim of discrimination."). This prediction was borne out when the Hicks case was re-
manded to the district court, which concluded that although the employer's reasons for terminating
the plaintiff were false, the plaintiff had not proven intentional discrimination. The Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's judgment for the employer. Hicks v. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 90 F.3d
285 (8th Cir. 1996).
64. In 1993, Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced S. 1776, 103d Cong. (1993), and Rep-
resentative Major Owens introduced H.R. 3680, 103d Cong. (1993), to restore the McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine proof structure for intentional disparate treatment. These bills did not sur-
vive committee hearings. See Congressional Index 28,368 and 35,066 (recording bill transfer to
committee and subsequent non-passage).
65. Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124.
66. Rule 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An employer's motion for summary judg-
ment typically is not entertained until the parties have conducted some discovery. Evans v. Tech-
nologies Applications & Serv., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996) ("As a general rule, summary
judgment is appropriate only after 'adequate time for discovery."') (quoting Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
In response to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff might seek further discovery
pursuant to Rule 56(f) which provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affi-
davits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make
such other order as is just.
FED. R. Clv. P. 56(0. To succeed on a Rule 56(f) motion, the plaintiff "must (1) articulate a plau-
sible basis for the belief that discoverable materials exist which would raise a trialworthy issue,
and (2) 'demonstrate good cause for failure to have conducted the discovery earlier."' Price v.
General Motors Corp., 931 F.2d 162, 164 (lst Cir. 1991) (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mas-
sachusetts Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 988 (1st Cir. 1988)); see also Evans, 80 F.3d
at 961-62 (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment for employer, where plaintiff
"never filed any discovery requests, moved for a continuance so she could conduct discovery, or
filed an affidavit as required by Rule 56(f)").
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lief that she was the victim of discrimination, summary judgment is appropri-
ate.
, 67
As Justice Souter explained in his dissent from Hicks, because the
factfinder's inquiry is no longer limited to the plaintiff disproving the
employer's reason, "pretrial discovery will become more extensive and wide-
ranging (if the plaintiff can afford it)--for a much wider set of facts could
prove to be both relevant and important at trial." r
The EEOC also has recognized the need for greater discovery in the post-
Hicks Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment cases that it files on be-
half of aggrieved individuals:
In discovery, it will be more important to develop contextual or, if
possible, direct evidence that supports the inference from a showing
of pretext. Employers will likely rely on contextual factors (e.g., a
sterling record of minority hiring; a minority decision-maker, etc.)
which (they'll argue) make it less likely that they would have dis-
criminated, even if the fact-finder doesn't believe the proffered rea-
son.... We may need to develop a contrary picture of the
employer's overall record. More generally, as Justice Souter suggest-
ed, the scope of permissible discovery now appears to be much wid-
er; much information will be relevant to persuading the jury to draw
the permitted inference, which would not have been relevant to the
mere showing of pretext. Previously, discovery requests relating to
other employment decisions might have been viewed as only margin-
ally relevant, and often overly burdensome. At the least, Hicks in-
creases the relevance of such materials, and in some cases-where
the employer explicitly attempts to paint a broad, favorable picture of
itself-they may now be very important.'
Similarly, the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law opines that a
plaintiff "will have to focus, more intensely than ever before, on discovery to
pierce [the employer's] lies."7
67. Hedican & Loudon, supra note 63, at 1008-09 & nn.70-72.
68. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 538 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice
Souter also stated that "[tihe majority's scheme, therefore, will promote longer trials and more
pre-trial discovery, threatening increased expense and delay in Title VII litigation for both plain-
tiffs and defendants, and increased burdens on the judiciary." Hicks, 509 U.S. at 538.
69. James R. Neely, Jr., General Counsel's Memorandum on Supreme Court's Hicks Deci-
sion, Aug. 3, 1993, available in Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA) 405:7151, 7154 (March 1994).
70. Life After Hicks: Strategy and Tactics for Plaintiffs and their Counsel, 7 Civ. RTS. ACT
AND EEO NEws 4, 5 (Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Employment Discrimina-
tion Project) (July 1, 1993). The passage continues:
A plaintiff can protect against the danger of having to disprove a panorama of possible
"nondiscriminatory reasons" "vaguely suggested" by the record by using all of the tools
of issue-narrowing available under the Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 16 pretrial confer-
ence orders setting out the issues, Rule 33 interrogatories enquiring as to all reasons,
Rule 34 requests for production demanding all documents bearing on the reasons and
their past application or failure of application to other employees, Rule 36 requests for
admissions pinning down the exclusivity of the reasons (with Rule 33 and Rule 34 dis-
covery requests triggered by any failure to admit), pretrial orders setting forth the issues,
and motions in limine to exclude evidence of any other reason.
Id. at 5.
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III. OVERVIEW OF DISCOVERY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 govern the discovery
process for employment discrimination cases brought in the federal courts.7
These discovery rules "allow the parties to develop fully and crystallize con-
cise factual issues for trial. 72 They are to be broadly and liberally con-
strued.73 This liberal construction, however, can lead to abuse by the parties,
with one commentator noting that discovery "now tends to dominate the litiga-
tion and inflict disproportionate costs and burdens. 74
A. The Role of District Judges and Magistrate Judges
Federal district judges and magistrate judges have great control over the
discovery process in employment discrimination litigation, with relatively little
appellate law to guide them.75 Appellate courts "normally do not become in-
volved with 'nitty gritty' rulings on discovery matters," such as analyzing
specific discovery requests and objections.7 6
A district judge may refer any civil case, including one involving a Cir-
cumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment claim, to a magistrate judge77 for
resolution of discovery matters. 8 The district judge will affirm the magistrate
judge's discovery rulings unless they are "clearly erroneous or contrary to
71. For a discussion of specific rules, see infra Parts II.B.-III.D.
72. Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973).
73. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("[D]iscovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment."); see also Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15 (1964).
74. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Re-
form, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 703, 703 (1989).
75. Burns, 483 F.2d at 304-05. The Burns court stated:
Because discovery matters are committed almost exclusively to the sound discretion of
the trial Judge, appellate rulings delineating the bounds of discovery under the Rules are
rare. But the Judge's discovery rulings, like his other procedural determinations, are not
entirely sacrosanct. If he fails to adhere to the liberal spirit of the Rules, we must re-
verse.
Id.
76. Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 733 (3d Cir. 1995); see also Mack v. Great
At. & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989) ("Circumstances warranting appellate
intervention in garden-variety pretrial discovery are infrequent.").
77. The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994)) established a system of magistrates to assist district
court judges.
78. Rule 73(a) provides:
When specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by local rule or order of the
district court and when all parties consent thereto, a magistrate judge may exercise the
authority provided by Title 28, U.S.C. § 636(c) and may conduct any or all proceedings,
including a jury or nonjury trial, in a civil case.
FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a). The Federal Magistrates Act provides:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate or a part-time Unit-
ed States magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial officer may conduct any or all
proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case,
when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he
serves.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1).
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law."79 A magistrate judge's ruling is clearly erroneous only when, despite
"evidence to support it," the district judge "is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.""s For example, a district
judge cannot affirm a magistrate judge's ruling where the magistrate judge has
failed to provide enough explanation for adequate review.' In many cases,
however, district judges view the clearly erroneous standard as granting magis-
trate judges "broad discretion, which will be overruled only if abused."82
Once a district judge has made a discovery ruling, whether in the first in-
stance or by reviewing the magistrate judge's initial ruling, the standard of
review on appeal to the circuit court is abuse of discretion, 3 which "occurs
only when the [district] court bases its decision on an erroneous ruling of law
or when there is no rational basis in the evidence for the ruling." 4 Some cir-
cuits also require that the district court's abuse of discretion result in "sub-
stantial prejudice."85
79. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(A) (1994). The Federal Magistrates Act provides:
[A] judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pretrial matter pending
before the court, except a motion for injunctive relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for
summary judgment, to dismiss or quash an indictment or information made by the de-
fendant, to suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit maintenance of
a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
and to involuntarily dismiss an action. A judge of the court may reconsider any pretrial
matter under this subparagraph (A) where it has been shown that the magistrate's order
is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. /
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see also Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC, 154 F.R.D. 63, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (applying the "clearly erroneous or contrary to law" standard).
80. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
81. E.g., Pisacane v. Enichem Am., Inc., No. 94 Civ 7843, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9755
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (remanding magistrate judge's discovery order because the district court "cannot
determine whether those determinations constitute an abuse of discretion").
82. Dubin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 125 F.R.D. 372, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); see also Frank
v. County of Hudson, 924 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D.N.J. 1996) ("Where, as here, the magistrate has
ruled on a non-dispositive matter such as a discovery motion, his ruling is entitled to great defer-
ence and is reversible only for abuse of discretion."); Lahr v. Fulbright & Jaworksi, L.L.P., 164
F.R.D. 204, 208 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (stating that nothing in FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a) "forbids applica-
tion" of abuse of discretion standard to magistrate judge's ruling).
83. See, e.g., Sempier, 45 F.3d at 774 (stating that "district courts have broad discretion to
manage discovery"); Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that district
courts "have substantial discretion to make such decisions to curtail the expense and intrusiveness
of discovery and trial"); Johnson v. Thompson, 971 F.2d 1487, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992) (reviewing
orders relating to discovery "for an abuse of discretion"); Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907
F.2d 1077, 1085 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (reviewing district court's discovery order on "abuse of discre-
tion"); Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that the district court is
"customarily accorded wide discretion in handling discovery matters"); Sanchez v. City of Santa
Ana, 936 F.2d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying abuse of discretion standard); Hollander v.
American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that "management of discovery
lies within the discretion of the district court"; thus, "an appellate court ordinarily will not disturb
a district court's ruling of a discovery request absent an abuse of discretion").
84. Heward v. Western Elec. Co., 35 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807, 811 (10th Cir. 19-
84).
85. E.g., Scales v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 925 F.2d 901, 906 (6th Cir. 1991) ("In reviewing
the district court's decision to limit discovery, this court will intervene only if it was an abuse of
discretion resulting in substantial prejudice."); Mack, 871 F.2d at 186 ("We will intervene in such
[discovery) matters only upon a clear showing of manifest injustice, that is, where the lower cou-
rt's discovery order was plainly wrong and resulted in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved par-
ty.").
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Occasionally a circuit court must reverse a district court's discovery rul-
ing, usually for restricting discovery rather than for allowing too much: "If
[the district judge] fails to adhere to the liberal spirit of the Rules, we must
reverse." 6 The district court must "examine each interrogatory" and must
fully review the magistrate judge's earlier ruling, if any. 7 The district court
certainly "overstep[s] the bounds of discretion" if it "decline[s] to state any
reasons for his order limiting the scope of discovery.""8
The circuit court's reversal of a district court's discovery ruling might
well result in reversal of a summary judgment grant for the employer 9 or
reversal of a trial judgment for the employer.'
B. Initial Disclosures Preceding Formal Discovery
To augment the traditional, formal discovery methods triggered by a
party's requests, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1) provides that each
party disclose to the other certain core information soon after the case is
filed.9 This initial disclosure provision, however, appears to have had mini-
86. Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973); see also Coughlin,
946 F.2d at 1159 (noting that the circuit court must reverse district court's discovery ruling which
"results in fundamental unfairness at trial"); cf. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 734 (finding that the district
court "far exceeded the outermost limits on its discretion" by denying the plaintiffs motion to
compel answers to specific interrogatories and instead ordering the employer to answer court-
drafted "Bill of Particulars"); Ardrey v. United Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 682 (4th Cir. 1986)
(stating that, "[allthough it is 'unusual to find an abuse of discretion in discovery matters,' ... a
district court may not, through discovery restrictiohs, prevent a plaintiff from pursuing a theory or
entire cause of action") (quoting Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d 614, 618 (5th Cir. 1982)).
87. Sempier, 45 F.3d at 735.
88. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 406 (5th Cir. 1983).
89. E.g., Sempier, 45 F.3d at 736 (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for
employer, where district court substituted its own vague and general Bill of Particulars for the
plaintiff's specific interrogatories); Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., No. 91-5300, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 3361, at *18 (6th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for
employer because "we are inclined to believe that further discovery is in order"); Hollander, 895
F.2d at 84 (vacating summary judgment on the discriminatory discharge claim "as this restriction
upon [plaintiff's] discovery unduly limited his ability to establish his argument that [the employe-
r's] discharge of him was pretextual"); Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th
Cir. 1985) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment for employer "because [plaintiff]
was improperly denied the opportunity to discover material that is relevant to the only bases on
which summary judgment could have been granted"); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655,
656 (11 th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's grant of summary judgment where plaintiff was
prevented from obtaining necessary statistical information); Trevino, 701 F.2d at 405-06 (reversing
district court's grant of summary judgment where plaintiff "was effectively hamstrung by the
district court's order limiting discovery").
90. E.g., Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (10th Cir. 1980) (reversing district
court's trial judgment for employer and remanding "to permit ... additional discovery"); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 349 (10th Cir. 1975) (reversing district court's trial judg-
ment for employer and ordering district court on remand "to reconsider plaintiffs' request for
discovery"); Burns, 483 F.2d at 302-03 (reversing district court's trial judgment for employer and
remanding so that the district court could make information available to plaintiff).
91. Rule 26(a)(1) provides:
Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall,
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties;
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual
likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particu-
larity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
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mal effect on the course of litigation, including that under the Circumstantial
Individual Disparate Treatment theory.
First, a great many district courts have opted out of the initial disclosure
provision, as expressly allowed by the Rule.92 Second, in many districts, the
parties themselves can opt out of initial disclosures by stipulation or local
rule.93 Third, given the prevalence of notice pleading, few complaints and
answers involving the Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory
contain many "disputed facts alleged with particularity," required to trigger
meaningful initial disclosures.94 Indeed, the plaintiff's complaint may even
contain allegations for which the plaintiff has no evidence, so long as those
allegations "are likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportuni-
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party that
are relevant to the disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other
evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such compu-
tation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered;
and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under
which an person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part of all of
a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for pay-
ments made to satisfy the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1).
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). There are 94 federal judicial districts, 45 of which have imple-
mented the initial disclosure rule as written and six of which have implemented the rule "with a
significant revision." 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGrr, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
(Supp. 1995) (reporting on a March 24, 1995 survey by the Research Division of the Federal Ju-
dicial Center). Of the 49 remaining districts that have not implemented disclosure, five require
initial disclosure under local rules or plans, and 15 give district judges discretion to require initial
disclosure in specific cases. Id. The remaining 28 districts have no disclosure requirements. Id.
93. In May of 1995, the FEDERAL DISCOVERY NEWS reported:
Never mind that the district has opted into Rule 26(a)(1). Embedded in the local rules is
a clause that allows attorneys to stipulate out of the Rule when they submit a report to
the court.... [A] recent survey ... showed that 10 of 19 judges surveyed in the district
reported that in 50% or more of their cases that the parties were stipulating out of
26(a)(1).
Beltway Attorneys Agree to Ignore Rule 26(a)(1), FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, May 1995.
94. Gerald G. MacDonald, Hesiod, Agesilaus, and Rule 26: A Proposal for a More Effective
Mandatory Initial Disclosure Procedure, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 819, 838 (1993) (explaining
that Rule 26(a) "insures its own ineffectiveness by creating an escape device which will allow
parties to avoid the mandatory disclosure requirements in the largest segment of civil litiga-
tion--those cases pleaded pursuant to the 'notice pleading' provisions of Rule 8(a)"). Rule 8(a)
provides that a pleading, such as the plaintiff's complaint, need contain only:
(1) [a] short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction de-
pends, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of
jurisdiction to support it, (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). At least one magistrate judge, however, has seen a return to more fact-spe-
cific pleadings. Kansas Magistrate Praises Effectiveness of New Rules, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS,
Oct. 1995 (discussing Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Rushfelt, who has published a "litany of discov-
ery orders" reports "seeing more specificity in the pleadings"). According to Judge Rushfelt: "[the
pleadings have] become longer and more detailed. That started happening even before the amend-
ment. What the new rules have done is accelerate that pattern." id.
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ty for further investigation or discovery."95 Accordingly, a plaintiff suing un-
der the Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment theory continues to rely
on traditional, formal discovery procedures to obtain additional information
about her case.
C. The Forms, Limits, and Timing of Discovery
The parties in litigation typically begin formal discovery after they have
met and conferred to establish a discovery plan.96 Pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), the parties are entitled to take discovery "regarding
any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action.""
The party seeking discovery must show that the information sought is
relevant;98 this showing is not difficult, as relevancy "has been construed bro-
adly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to
other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.'"
Relevancy extends beyond the issues presented in the pleadings, "for discovery
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 l(b)(3).
96. Rule 26(d) provides: "Except when authorized under these rules or by local rule, order,
or agreement of the parties, a party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties
have met and conferred as required by subdivision (f)." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d). Rule 26(f) pro-
vides:
Except in actions exempted by local rule or when otherwise ordered, the parties shall, as
soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling conference is
held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b), meet to discuss the nature and basis
of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of
the case, to make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(l), and to
develop a proposed discovery plan.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
97. Rule 26(b)(1) provides that the discovery is relevant:
whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, con-
dition and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things and the identity
and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure incorporate common-law privileges, with the attor-
ney-client privilege being the most important in employment discrimination litigation. See, e.g.,
Curcio v. Chinn Enters., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 9, 10-11 (N.D. I11. 1996) (holding that
attomey-client privilege protects questionnaires used at employer's sexual harassment training
seminars conducted by employer's attorneys).
Rule 26(b)(3) offers a more limited protection for an attomey's work product, mandating
production of:
documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable ... and prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representa-
tive, .... only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of
the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without
undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Rule 26(b)(5) further requires that any party claiming privilege or work-
product protection: "shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the docu-
ments, communications, or things not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing
information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). This article addresses only those discovery
requests by the plaintiff which are non-privileged and do not constitute work product.
98. McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 57 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
99. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978).
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itself is designed to help define and clarify the issues.""'° The parties' re-
quested information "need not be admissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence."'' Thus, discovery should be allowed "if there is any possibility
that the information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the ac-
tion."
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(5) lists the traditional, formal meth-
ods of discovery available to the parties: depositions upon oral examination or
written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents and things
or permission to enter upon land or other property; physical and mental exami-
nations; and requests for admission.0 3 The methods may be used in any or-
der." 4
The district court can restrict or prohibit the use of any method of discov-
ery if:
(i) [t]he discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has
had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain the infor-
mation sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discov-
ery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance
of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the pro-
posed discovery in resolving the issues.0 5
Additionally, there are presumptive numerical limitations on two discovery
methods. Each party typically is restricted to no more than ten depositions,
100. Id.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Pisacane v. Enichem Am., Inc., No. 94 Civ. 7843,
1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9755, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 1996) (contrasting district court's admis-
sion of evidence under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403 with "a determination of relevance
under the much broader standard" in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1); Clarke v. Mellon
Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (refusing to bar broad
discovery request though it yielded "some evidence that is not admissible," so long as it was "cal-
culated ... to lead to the production of relevant matter in view of [plaintiff's allegations)");
Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42, 46 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding that "relevance, for
purposes of Rule 26, cannot be equated with admissibility at trial or ultimate probativeness").
102. Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 859 (D.
Kan. 1996) (quoting Smith v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 137 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Kan. 1991)).
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(5).
104. Rule 26(d) provides:
Unless the court, upon motion, for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in
the interests of justice, orders otherwise, methods of discovery may be used in any se-
quence, and the fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or oth-
erwise, shall not operate to delay another party's discovery.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
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whether upon oral or written questions."9 Further, each party typically is
limited to twenty-five interrogatories, "including all discrete subparts."' 7
D. Discovery Disputes
The parties to litigation invariably have disputes about the appropriate
scope of discovery. Assuming that one party has not waived its objection to
the discovery,"~ or that the parties have been unable to reach a compro-
mise,"9 the parties will resort to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37
to protect their positions.
1. Motions for Protective Orders
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) allows the party from whom dis-
covery is sought to move for a protective order from the district court, but
only after that party "has conferred or attempted to confer with other affected
parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action."" If there is
"good cause shown" for a protective order, the district court "may make any
order which justice requires to protect [the party] from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.."" The party moving for a
protective order "must make a specific demonstration of facts in support of the
request as opposed to conclusory or speculative statements about the need for
106. Rule 30(a)(2) provides:
A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to the extent consistent with
the principles stated in Rule 26(b)(2), if... without written stipulation of the parties,
(A) a proposed deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken under
this rule or Rule 31 by the plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by third-party defendants.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2).
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). Rule 33(a) provides: "Without leave of court or written stipula-
tion, any party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in num-
ber including all discrete subparts .... Leave to serve additional interrogatories shall be granted to
the extent consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2)." FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a); see also McMe-
namin v. M & P Trucking Co., No. 93-6888, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4549, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 7,
1994) ("The drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, I assume after careful consideration,
concluded that in the usual civil lawsuit, after self-executing discovery, a limit of twenty-five
interrogatories, subject to discretionary expansion of the quantity in appropriate cases, is reason-
able.").
108. E.g., Scarfo v. Cabletron Sys. Inc., 153 F.R.D. 9, 11 (D.N.H. 1994) (holding that an em-
ployer must abide by its initial agreement to provide plaintiff with certain discovery, even though
it later objected to the scope of that discovery).
109. For example, the parties may reach a stipulated protective order to preserve the confiden-
tiality of material. See supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). District courts take seriously the requirement that parties attempt
to meet and confer prior to filing discovery motions. See, e.g., Chambers v. Capital Cities/ABC,
157 F.R.D. 3, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) ("Attempts to agree on what should be done item-by-item should
precede requests for blanket sweeping rules by the Magistrate Judge followed by filing of objec-
tions to the Magistrate Judge's rulings.").
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). These options include:
(1) that the disclosure or discovery not be had; (2) that the disclosure or discovery may
be had only on specified terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or
place; (3) that the discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that
selected by the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or
that the scope of the disclosure or discovery be limited to certain matters.
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a protective order and the harm which will be suffered without one.""' 2 The
party prevailing on the motion for a protective order may recover its fees and
costs.' 1
3
In Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment litigation, the "undue
burden or expense" language is often cited by the employer in its attempt to
avoid the plaintiff's discovery."4 The employer cannot prevail on a motion
for a protective order merely by arguing that an otherwise legitimate discovery
request is burdensome or expensive, for "[tlhe production of discovery materi-
als in litigation is often a costly and burdensome enterprise" requiring "many
hours of labor unrelated to any other business purpose."'" Rather, the em-
ployer must show that the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive."6
In assessing burden and expense, the district court must take into account "the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the pro-
posed discovery in resolving the issues.""' 7
Nor can the employer prevail on its motion for a protective order merely
by arguing that it would be forced to prepare an extensive list of information,
for the generation of such lists is not always unduly burdensome or expen-
sive."' Moreover, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33(d), the
employer resisting discovery has the right, under certain situations, to produce
its business records in lieu of a narrative answer or list."9 If the employer
112. Wendt v. Walden Univ., Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1542, 1543 (D. Minn.
1996).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (referring to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(4) and its pro-
visions relating to the award of expenses).
114. See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
115. Orbovich v. Macalester College, 119 F.R.D. 411, 416 (D. Minn. 1988).
116. See, e.g., Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(holding that in order to avoid complying with a discovery request, the party must show that com-
pliance would be unduly burdensome) (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); see also Ladson v. Ulltra
E. Parking Corp., 164 F.R.D. 376, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Defendants do not however, claim that
production of the files would be more burdensome than supplying the information that they have
already offered instead."); Orbovich, 119 F.R.D. at 416 ("The resistance to discovery for those
reasons will not be sustained, however, unless the discovery sought is found to be unreasonably
burdensome.").
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2).
118. See Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 307 (5th Cir. 1973) ("Of course, the
extensive listing of information required to fully answer the interrogatories is somewhat cumberso-
me. But... the fact that an interrogatory calls for a list does not make it improper.").
119. Rule 33(d) provides:
Where the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business
records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served or from an examina-
tion, audit or inspection of such business records, including a compilation, abstract or
summary thereof, and the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially
the same for the party serving the interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient
answer to such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be de-
rived or ascertained and to afford the party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportu-
nity to examine, audit or inspect such records and to make copies, compilations, ab-
stracts or summaries. A specification shall be in sufficient detail to permit the interrogat-
ing party to locate and to identify, as readily as can the party served, the records from
which the answer may be ascertained.
FED. R. Civ. P. 33(d).
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cannot segregate the requested information, however, "it may be required to
provide broader" information. 2 '
2. Motions to Compel
The party who has propounded discovery and has not received a full re-
sponse may file a motion "for an order compelling.. . discovery" under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(2)(B). 2' The motion to compel, like the
motion for a protective order, "must include a certification that the movant has
in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing
to make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material with-
out court action."' 2 The party prevailing on the motion to compel may re-
cover its costs and fees.
23
Just as the party seeking a protective order must show good cause, the
party opposing a motion to compel "bears the burden of establishing lack of
relevance by demonstrating that the requested discovery either does not come
within the broad scope of relevance ... or is of such marginal relevance that
the potential harm occasioned by discovery would outweigh the ordinary pre-
sumption in favor of broad disclosure."' 24
3. Failure to Comply with a Court's Discovery Order
Once a district court has ruled on a motion for a protective order or a mo-
tion to compel, the losing party must comply with the ruling or risk a variety
of severe sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b).'25 Sanctions
include allowing the winning party additional discovery,'26 establishing facts
against the losing party,"' entering default judgment against the defen-
dant, "'28 and dismissing the plaintiff's claims.'29 The court might give the
120. Rifkinson v. CBS Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 98, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2)(A); see also Ballou v. University of Kan. Ctr., 159 F.R.D. 558,
560 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that plaintiff's single letter to opposing counsel prior to filing motion
to compel was inadequate, where letter reiterated disclosure request, but did not indicate plaintiff's
intent to file a motion).
123. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A).
124. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., No. 93-4064-SAC, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20675, at *4 (D.
Kan. Sept. 22, 1994); see also Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1451, 1454 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) ("The Court has ordered similar discovery in other discrimination
cases and the defendant has offered no convincing reason that the same discovery should not be
allowed in the present case."). But see Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(denying plaintiffs' motion to compel and placing the burden on plaintiffs to show relevance).
125. Nonetheless, the sanctions in FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) are not without limits. See Sempier
v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 735 (3d Cir.) (stating that "none of the weapons in [Rule
37's] formidable arsenal include the wholesale substitution of court-engineered discovery").
126. Jackson v. Harvard Univ., 900 F.2d 464, 469 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming district court's
discovery sanctions of "a continuance and an open run at further discovery").
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A); cf Hedican & Loudon, supra note 63, at 1015-16 ("If an
employer fails to provide critical information in a disclosure, and the jury is instructed that the
employer failed to do so despite its obligation to produce that information, this certainly could be
viewed as evidence that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext.").
128. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
129. Id.; see also Spiller v. U.S.V. Lab., Inc., 842 F.2d 535, (1st Cir. 1988) (affirming district
court's dismissal of complaint for plaintiff's failure to comply with discovery order).
[Vol. 74:1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISCOVERY
non-complying party a warning prior to such sanctions, but need not always
do so. 30 The court also may order the non-complying party to pay the op-
posing counsel's fees 3' and may fine the non-complying party. 32
IV. THE SPECIAL DISCOVERY NEEDS OF A PLAINTIFF IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL
INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION
The courts routinely state that discovery in employment discrimination
litigation is special.'33 An individual plaintiff suing "a huge industrial em-
ployer" creates a "modem day David and Goliath confrontation .... She
needs ample discovery, because "the nature of the proofs required to demon-
strate unlawful discrimination may often be indirect or circumstantial."'35
The anti-discrimination statutes are broad, and remedial,'36 and therefore the
130. E.g., Willis, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1454 (granting plaintiff's motion to com-
pel answers to interrogatories and stating that the court "will not tolerate further delays by the
defendant in discovery and if any additional motions to compel are filed by the plaintiff, the Court
will seriously consider imposing sanctions under... Rule 37").
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b); see also Shipes v. Trinity Indus., 987 F.2d 311, 323-24 (5th Cir.
1993) (affirming district court's award of attorneys fees against party who violated court order
regarding discovery).
132. Grimes v. City of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming magistrate
judge's fine of $500 per day for party's non-compliance with court order).
133. See, e.g., Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 734 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Nonetheless,
the district court's discretion has boundaries, and in particular, we frown upon unnecessary discov-
ery limitations in Title VII, and hence ADEA, cases."); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d
655, 658 (11th Cir. 1983) ("[W]e note that liberal discovery rules are applied in Title VII litiga-
tion."); Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405-06 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The imposition of
unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VII cases."); Rich v.
Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343-44 (10th Cir. 1975) ("It is plain that the scope of dis-
covery through interrogatories and requests for production of documents is limited only by rele-
vance and burdensomeness, and in an EEOC case the discovery scope is extensive.... It cannot
be said, therefore, that the policy of this court has been to narrowly circumscribe discovery in
EEOC cases."); Wilson v. Martin County Hosp. Dist., 149 F.R.D. 553, 555 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
("The imposition of unnecessary limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VU
cases."); Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60, 62 (D. Del. 1993) ("Discovery requests in dis-
crimination cases have received particularly liberal treatment by the courts."); Flanagan v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42, 46 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 is] not to
be interpreted so as 'to deprive a party of discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair
opportunity to develop and prepare the case.' . . . This is particularly true in Title VII cases where
the imposition of unnecessary discovery limitations is to be avoided.") (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26
advisory note); Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 506 (N.D. I11. 1986)
("The scope of discovery is especially broad in Title VII cases.").
Occasionally, courts will state that discovery in employment discrimination litigation is to
be treated no differently than discovery in other types of cases. E.g., Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture
Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (noting that Title VII actions have been granted
liberal discovery, but all requests still must follow "traditional discovery notions of relevancy and
must not impose an undue burden upon the responding party"); see also Robbins v. Camden City
Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 55 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that "[tihe responses sought must comport
with the traditional notions of relevancy and must not impose an undue burden on the responding
party"); Hardrick v. Legal Servs. Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983) (noting concern "about
'fishing expeditions,' discovery abuse and inordinate expense involved in overbroad and far-rang-
ing discovery requests").
134. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Corp., 411 F.2d 998, 1005 (5th Cir. 1969).
135. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 119 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Marshall v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 592 (5th Cir. 1978) ("A plaintiff who must shoulder the
burden of proving that the reasons given for his discharge are pretextual should not normally be
denied the information necessary to establish that claim.").
136. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 888 (7th Cir. 1996) ("It has long been
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courts should not "allow procedural technicalities to impede the full vindica-
tion of guaranteed rights."' 
37
The discovery accorded a private individual in her Circumstantial Individ-
ual Disparate Treatment case should be as broad as the discovery accorded the
EEOC in its litigation; the individual, in vindicating her rights under an anti-
discrimination statute, essentially serves as a private attorney-general for other
potentially aggrieved individuals.'38 As the Tenth Circuit stated in the semi-
nal case Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,'39 whether the plaintiff is an indi-
vidual or the EEOC, "[iut is plain that the scope of discovery... is limited
only by relevance and burdensomeness."' 40
A. The Relevance of Workforce Data
The Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff undoubtedly
needs discovery beyond the bounds of the facts upon which her claim is
based. 4' The courts should not assume that the plaintiff brings a "highly in-
dividualized claim[]."42 Rather, because the employer's discrimination
against the plaintiff, as a member of a protected group, "is by definition class
discrimination,"'43 the plaintiff is entitled to data about other persons work-
recognized that Title VII is a remedial statute with a broad sweep."); Mardell v. Harleysville Life
Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1235 (3d Cir. 1994) ("We also bear in mind that, as remedial statutes,
Title VII and ADEA should be liberally construed to advance their beneficent purposes."); Marti-
nez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984) ("Title VII 'is a remedial statute to be liberally
construed in favor of victims of discrimination."') (quoting Davis v. Valley Distrib. Co., 522 F.2d
827, 832 (9th Cir. 1975)); Thurber v. Jack Reilly's, Inc., 717 F.2d 633, 634-35 (1st Cir. 1983)
("Title VII was considered a generally remedial statute, and the prevailing majority in Congress
intended to give it broad effect."); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 355, 358 (6th Cir.
1969) ("Title VII ... should not be construed narrowly.").
137. Bums v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1973).
138. Id. ("Any information relevant-in a discovery sense-to an EEOC investigation is like-
wise relevant to the private attomey-general, either in his individual role or in his capacity as the
claimed representative of a class.").
139. 522 F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir. 1975).
140. Rich, 522 F.2d at 343.
141. See Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., No. 92-CV-4823, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at *7
(E.D. Pa. May 11, 1993) ("The needs of the individual plaintiff to information ... requires that
the parameters of discovery be broader than the specific, individual facts upon which the claim is
based."); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 55 ("Nonetheless, the applicable discovery parameters must be
broader than the specific, individualized facts upon which her claims are based because of the
nature of the proofs required to demonstrate unlawful discrimination, which may often be indirect
or circumstantial.").
142. Hardrick, 96 F.R.D. at 619.
143. Blue Bell Boots, 418 F.2d at 358; see also Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-
33 (5th Cir. 1968) ("The suit is ... more than a private claim" of discrimination on the basis of
the individual's protected class, rather "the suit is perforce a sort of class action for fellow em-
ployees similarly situated."); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 58 ("Discrimination on the basis of race is by
definition class discrimination and the existence of a pattern of racial discrimination in a job cate-




ing for that employer.'" In fact, she is entitled to much of the same informa-
tion as in a systemic disparate treatment case.
45
Moreover, the plaintiff in a Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment
case, whether the individual or the EEOC,' should be entitled to the same
expansive definition of relevance as accorded the EEOC when it investigates
the underlying charge of discrimination 47 and requires court enforcement of
an administrative subpoena to obtain data from the employer."
The plaintiff may need workforce discovery to bolster her prima facie
case, especially as to the qualifications of the competing employees or appli-
144. There may be related employers, such as parents and subsidiaries. See Chambers v. Capi-
tal Cities/ABC, 159 F.R.D. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing as "to what extent, when and
how information relating to personnel practices of related entities may be obtained by plaintiff").
This article focuses on a single employing entity.
145. See Gomez v. Martin Marietta Corp., 50 F.3d 1511, 1520 (10th Cir. 1995) ("It is well
settled that in a Title VII suit, an employer's general practices are relevant even when a plaintiff is
asserting an individual claim for disparate treatment."); Burns, 483 F.2d at 306 ("The importance
of obtaining an overall statistical picture of an employer's practices with regard to both Black and
White employees does not depend on the presence of an alleged 'pattern or practice' or a valid
charge of class discrimination or class action."); Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 46-47 ("Although plain-
tiff has alleged individual disparate treatment... such claims, of necessity, require discovery of
and comparison with the treatment accorded other employees .... Comparative information is
necessary to afford plaintiff a fair opportunity to develop her case and may be relevant to establish
the pretextual nature of defendant's conduct.").
A few courts have adopted a stricter approach. According to the Middle District of Geor-
gia: "Plaintiffs do not point to a policy or an institution-wide practice. Instead, they direct their
grievances toward particular supervisors .... Furthermore, other than counsel's belief that Defen-
dant's database may verify a class-wide discriminatory animus, Plaintiffs have set forth no show-
ing that further discovery will substantiate the class action." Lumpkin v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 161 F.R.D. 480, 482 (M.D. Ga. 1995). The Lumpkin court granted an employer's motion
for a protective order limiting the scope of discovery in the absence of a class action. Id.; see also
Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545, 547 (D.D.C. 1983) ("Because this is an
individual suit rather than a class action and plaintiff has not shown a sufficiently particularized
need for this information, the Court will limit discovery.").
146. The Tenth Circuit explained why individuals and the EEOC should be treated the same:
The fact that these cases had to do with discovery efforts by the EEOC itself rather than
by individuals cannot serve as a point of departure. The Act's purposes in each instance
are the same. Whether, then, the action is by a plaintiff or by the government, the object
is 'the elimination of employment discrimination, whether practiced knowingly or
unconsciously.'... Information relevant in an EEOC inquiry is equally relevant in a
private action.
Rich, 522 F.2d at 344 (citations omitted).
147. The EEOC investigates charges of discrimination brought under Title VII and the
ADEA. Section 709(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1994), provides that the EEOC "shall
at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the right to copy any
evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employ-
ment practices ... and is relevant to the charge under investigation." Section 7(a) of the ADEA,
29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1994), provides for similar EEOC investigations, "in accordance with the
powers and procedures in sections 209 and 211 [of the Fair Labor Standards Act]."
148. If an employer does not comply with the EEOC's request for information, the EEOC can
petition the district court for enforcement. Title VII § 710(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (1994) (provid-
ing that section II of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1994), will apply to
EEOC investigations); ADEA § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1994) (incorporating section 9 of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1994), which incorporates sections 9 and 10 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 49, 50 (1994), which provides for subpoena power).
In enforcing the EEOC subpoena, "courts have generously construed the term 'relevant'
and have afforded the Commission access to virtually any material that might cast light on the
allegations against the employer." EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1984).
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cants and as to the employer's subsequent efforts in filling the position.'49 It
is clear that the plaintiff "does not have to prove a prima facie case to justify
a request which appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence."' 50
The plaintiff also may need workforce discovery to prove pretext. Even
prior to Hicks' more onerous definition of pretext, courts realized the necessity
of "[c]areful review of discovery requests" once an employer has produced
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the adverse action, "because the
plaintiff 'must take the extra step of presenting evidence to show that the
reasons given [by the employer] are an attempt to cover up the employer's
alleged real discriminatory motive.'""
Additionally, the plaintiff may need workforce discovery to prove her
entitlement to remedies such as lost wages and benefits,' injunctive re-
lief,"'53 and liquidated or punitive damages. '54
Three types of workforce data are particularly important for the plaintiff
to discover, typically through interrogatories or requests for production of
documents: a statistical profile of employees, personnel files of employees,
and records of charges or complaints filed by employees.
149. See Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., No. 91-5300, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3361, at *16 (6th
Cir. Feb. 7, 1992) (stating discovery of other employees' personnel files "is clearly necessary for
[plaintiff] to establish a prima facie case of discrimination"); Weahkee v. Norton, 621 F.2d 1080,
1082 (10th Cir. 1980) (reversing trial judgment for employer where plaintiff was denied discovery
of personnel files because "[tihe qualifications and job performance of these employees in com-
parison with the plaintiff's qualifications and performance is at the heart of this controversy");
Davis v. Pyramid Prods., Inc., No. 93-CV-72174-DT, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11761, at *17 (E.D.
Mich. June 6, 1994) (comparing the plaintiff's employment record with his competitor and con-
cluding that plaintiff had not established a prima facie case).
150. Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 860 (D.
Kan. 1996).
151. Parrish, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3361, at *17-18 (quoting Irvin v. Airco Carbide, 837
F.2d 724, 726 (6th Cir. 1987)) (alteration in original).
152. See Blue Bell Boors, 418 F.2d at 358 ("Moreover, evidence concerning employment
practices other than those specifically charged by complainants may properly be considered by the
Commission in framing a remedy.").
153. See EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1087 (5th Cir. 1987) (affirming district
court's entry of company-wide injunction in an ADEA individual disparate treatment case brought
by the EEOC); Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984)
(stating that in a Title VII individual disparate treatment case, "injunctive relief may benefit indi-
viduals not party to the action, and that classwide injunctive relief may be appropriate in an indi-
vidual action," so long as the plaintiff "would benefit personally from the relief requested") (citing
Evans v. Hartnett County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1982), and Meyer v. Brown
& Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1981)); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 554 F.2d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 1977) (stating that ADEA cases "establish that a nationwide or
companywide injunction is appropriate only when the facts indicate a company policy or practice
in violation of the statute").
154. Section 7(b) of the ADEA provides that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to liquidated
damages for an employer's "willful violation[]" of the statute. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994). In an
ADEA case, the District of Delaware stated, "[i]f plaintiff establishes any prior adverse legal ac-
tions in ADEA matters, the existence of such rulings would shed light on the issue of wilfulness if
the fact-finder first determines an ADEA violation occurred." Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D.
60, 63 (D. Del. 1993). By analogy to Finch, discovery of workforce data in a Title VII case would
be relevant to an award of punitive damages, which are allowed against a non-governmental em-
ployer if the plaintiff proves that the employer acted "with malice or with reckless indifference" to
an aggrieved individual's rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1977A(b)(1) (1994).
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1. Statistical Profile of Employees
A Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff is entitled to
discover the statistical profile of other employees. For example, a plaintiff
alleging age discrimination in transfers and promotions should be able to dis-
cover the percentage of employees in the protected class who received trans-
fers and promotions, compared with the percentage of all employees in that
protected class.'55 The courts cannot per se reject the use of statistics in an
individual case.
56
Some courts allow this statistical evidence to buttress the plaintiff's prima
facie case, even though such evidence does not fit squarely within any of the
four prima facie elements.'57
The more important use of statistical evidence, however, is at the pretext
stage. The McDonnell Douglas Court observed that "statistics as to [the
employer's] policy and practice may be helpful" in determining pretext,'58
although generalized statistics "may not be in and of themselves controlling"
in an individual's case.'59
Workforce statistical profiles may effectively rebut the legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason articulated by the employer." The profiles also relate to
155. Bruno v. W.B. Saunders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 767 (3d Cir. 1989).
156. See Cross v. City of Ontario, No. 95-55437, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24417, at *13 (9th
Cir. Sept. 16, 1996) (reversing district court's determination that "statistical evidence was invalid
as a matter of law"); cf. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698 (7th Cir. 1987) ("All evidence
is probabilistic-statistical evidence merely explicitly so.").
157. See, e.g., Smith v. Homer, 839 F.2d 1530, 1536 n.8 (l1th Cir. 1988) (finding statistical
information "'relevant and important"' in an "individual case of disparate treatment") (quoting
Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1131 (1 1th Cir. 1984)); Ardrey v. United
Parcel Serv., 798 F.2d 679, 684 (4th Cir. 1986) (suggesting "such evidence may help establish a
prima facie case"); Diaz v. American Tel. & Tel., 752 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding
statistical information "helpful in establishing a prima facie case 'despite the fact that [it] may not
be directly probative of any of the four specific elements set forth by McDonnell Douglas"') (qu-
oting Lynn v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 656 F.2d 1337, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1989)) (alteration in
original); Minority Employees at NASA v. Beggs, 723 F.2d 958, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (allowing
statistical evidence to "'establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in an individual
case' even though such data is generally used in class action cases to show a pattern or practice of
discrimination") (quoting Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); Weahkee v.
Norton, 621 F.2d 1080, 1083 (10th Cir. 1980) (ruling that "statistical evidence may be used to
establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination").
158. McDonnell Douglas Co. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973) (alteration in original).
159. Id. at 805 n.19; see also Carmichael, 738 F.2d at 1131 ("[S]tatistics alone cannot make a
case of individual disparate treatment.").
160. See Cross, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 24417, at *13-14 (approving use of statistical evi-
dence "to show that defendants' stated reasons for rejecting [plaintiff's] promotion were
pretextual"); Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding it
"well-settled that an individual disparate treatment plaintiff may use statistical evidence regarding
an employer's general practices at the pretext stage to help rebut the employer's purported nondis-
criminatory explanation"); MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 1988)
(describing statistical evidence as "surely the kind of fact which could cause a reasonable trier of
fact to raise an eyebrow, and proceed to assess the employer's explanation for this outcome");
Weahkee, 621 F.2d at 1083 (holding that, after an employer "has come forward with legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for the action contested, a plaintiff may rely on statistics to discredit the
reasons the employer presented for its action"); Finch, 149 F.R.D. at 63 (stating "[lt follows that
information on this potentially discriminatory conduct could be used by a plaintiff to ... rebut
any non-discriminatory reason offered by a defendant").
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the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, as required by Hicks: "Such a
discriminatory pattern is probative of motive and can therefore create an infer-
ence of discriminatory intent with respect to the individual employment deci-
sion at issue.''
The plaintiff is entitled to discover the raw statistical data about fellow
employees even though the comparisons she draws ultimately may lack in
weight or relevance. 62 Moreover, if she has other evidence to discredit the
employer's articulated reason, her "quantitative [statistical] evidence does not
need to reach the degree of certainty required of plaintiffs who present no
proof of discrimination besides a statistical pattern."'63
2. Personnel Files of Employees
The Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff frequently un-
covers key evidence in other employees' personnel files, which are, of course,
in "the exclusive control" of the employer." This evidence may be used in
161. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363; see also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d
509, 542 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating "statistical evidence of an employer's pattern and practice with
respect to minority employment may be relevant to a showing of pretext"); Ardrey, 798 F.2d at
684 (noting that "[sluch evidence ... is often crucial for the plaintiff's attempt to establish an
inference of discrimination"); Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d 655, 658 (1 1th Cir. 1983)
(finding "[sitatistical information concerning an employer's general policy and practice concerning
minority employment possibly relevant to a showing of pretext, even in a case alleging an individ-
ual instance of discrimination rather than a 'pattern and practice' of discrimination"); Clarke, 25
Fed. R. Serv. 3d at 1177 (noting such evidence "may reveal patterns of discrimination against a
group of employees; increasing the likelihood that an employer's offered explanation for an em-
ployment decision regarding a particular individual masks a discriminatory motive"). The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania explained:
In order to prove any discriminatory intent, plaintiff contends that company-wide statis-
tical evidence regarding the progress of blacks in the workforce would support his posi-
tion that [defendant] declared the labor surplus as a pretext to remove [plaintiff] from his
position because of [the plaintiff's] race, and replace him with a white employee. In-
deed, statistical analysis might well be the only means by which plaintiff could prove an
alleged pattern or practice of racial discrimination.
Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Jackson v. Kenney, 762 F.
Supp. 863, 866 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (allowing plaintiff to prove pretext by "present[ing] statistical
proof-defendant's answers to interrogatories-which shows that the number of females in the
[defendant's] workforce is lower thanthe percentage of females holding similar positions in the
private sector").
Cases brought by the EEOC are to the same effect. For example, the Fourth Circuit stated
that:
the EEOC's request for job classifications, hire dates, and placement information is all
highly relevant and material to a charge alleging the existence of a discriminatory pro-
motion policy and classification of jobs by race. [The individual's] charge alleges the
existence of at least plant-wide policies and the requested information would seem to
contain very direct evidence of the existence or non-existence of such policies.
Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1971); see also Elaine W. Shoben, The
Use of Statistics to Prove Intentional Employment Discrimination, 46 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS.
221, 237-42 (1983) (discussing how discriminatory intent may be inferred from statistical evi-
dence).
162. E.g., MacDissi, 856 F.2d at 1059 (entitling the district court to "give the most weight" to
statistics from plaintiff's own department); Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113
F.R.D. 502, 507 (N.D. Il. 1986) (finding statistics from other locations with lower percentages of
minority employees went "to the weight, not the relevancy of the evidence").
163. MacDissi, 856 F.2d at 1058.
164. Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991).
[Vol. 74:1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISCOVERY
the prima facie case, to establish the qualifications for the position in ques-
tion."6 It also may be used to discredit the employer's reason for its adverse
action and to infer intentional discrimination."' Additionally, it is relevant
for damages calculations.'67 Even without "a particularly broad definition of
'relevance,"' there should be "wide discovery. ' '
A prudent plaintiff should not request the employees' entire personnel
files, recognizing that they may contain irrelevant "personal and family mat-
ters. , , Instead, she should request all portions of the personnel files relating
to specific issues such as performance evaluations and disciplinary actions, 7 '
which certainly are or "might be" relevant. 7' The plaintiff undoubtedly re-
quires personnel documents for all employees in her protected class and/or
implicated in a similar adverse employment action.' Moreover, she must
165. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
166. See Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1159 (finding evidence in personnel files of repeated disparity
in punishment "clearly relevant in considering pretext"); Wilson v. Martin County Hosp. Dist.,
149 F.R.D. 553, 555 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (finding "all or parts of these personnel files [could] be
central to plaintiff's effort to prove pretext and are therefore subject to disclosure"); Flanagan,
111 F.R.D. at 47 (viewing comparative information as "necessary to afford plaintiff a fair opportu-
nity to develop her case" and possibly "relevant to establish the pretextual nature of defendant's
conduct"); Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 839 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(granting bulk of plaintiff's motion to compel "personnel files of numerous employees who were
either 'terminated as part of defendant's [alleged] pattern or practice of terminating older employ-
ees, had [allegedly] been otherwise discriminated against on account of age, or had been [alleged-
ly] preferentially retained by the defendant company in the department in which plaintiff worked,"
even in the face of defendant's objection "that those people held jobs that the plaintiff was not
qualified to perform and therefore the information is irrelevant" because "this information could
be relevant to the plaintiff's case if these employees were retained for reasons having to do with
age") (alterations in original).
167. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
168. Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1159.
169. Sosky v. International Mill Serv. Inc., No. 94-2833, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8507, at
*13-14 (E.D. Pa. 1995); see also EEOC v. Avco New Idea Div., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
736, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1978) ("[While] there no doubt is much that is irrelevant to this action con-
tained in such persons' personnel files, those files might reasonably be expected to yield probative
evidence of plaintiff's claims.").
170. United States v. Board of Educ. Caddo Parish, No. 94-0155, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10740, at *1 (W.D. La. June 13, 1995). The court continued:
Plaintiff justifies Request [for Production of Documents] by arguing that 'the contents of
a personnel file invariably contain relevant information.' . . . Plaintiff has requested the
pond so that it may go fishing. The rules require that plaintiff request the individual fish
themselves. Plaintiff must request documents by specific relevant categories. If those
documents are found in the personnel files, they must then be produced.
Id.; see also Sosky, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8507, at * 14 (finding the plaintiff not entitled to entire
personnel files, but could, "within the time limits set for discovery, recast his request to demand
disclosure of relevant documents in those files, i.e. transfers, evaluation reports, salary informa-
tion, job disposition, complaints about any type of discrimination, discipline, etc.").
171. Ladson v. Ulltra E. Parking Corp., 164 F.R.D. 376, 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). The court also
stated that it was "at a loss to see why current employees' files might not provide information
about hiring and promotion that could be relevant or could lead to the discovery of relevant evi-
dence." Id.; see also Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 56 Fair Emp. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451, 1454
(E.D. Tenn. 1991) (finding personnel files generally relevant).
172. Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 839 (N.D. Ga. 1984)
(granting bulk of plaintiff's motion to compel "personnel files of numerous employees who were
either 'terminated as part of defendant's [alleged] pattern or practice of terminating older employ-
ees, had [allegedly] been otherwise discriminated against on account of age, or had been [alleged-
ly] preferentially retained by the defendant company in the department in which plaintiff worked")
(alteration in original); see also Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (sub-
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have access to personnel documents of the supervisors and managers who
rendered the adverse employment decision.'73 The employer must identify by
name those employees, supervisors, and managers, for such identification is
essential to the plaintiff's follow-up discovery.'
Occasionally employers erroneously refuse to produce such personnel files
on the grounds of privilege. Under federal law, applied to the plaintiff's claims
under a federal anti-discrimination statute,' no true privilege exists.'76
Employers also might refuse to produce the documents by challenging the
information as private or confidential.'7 Some courts agree with the employ-
er and deny the plaintiff discovery.' 8 Other courts order the discovery to
jecting employment information regarding a competing candidate in an employment discrimination
case to discovery"); cf Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district
court's discovery limitations on personnel files because the circumstances of the co-employees
whose personnel files plaintiff sought "were not close enough to [plaintiffs] to make comparisons
productive").
173. See Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F.R.D. 4, 4 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (granting
plaintiffs motion to compel "personnel, appraisal and discipline files" of three managerial em-
ployees involved in plaintiff's termination); EEOC v. County of San Benito, 818 F. Supp. 289,
291 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (enforcing EEOC subpoena to obtain personnel record of supervisor of char-
ging party); In Avco New Idea Div., the court stated:
The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is that unequal standards were applied to women
in the defendant company's classification and discharge policies. If such unequal treat-
ment did exist, it necessarily was carried out by the defendant company's supervisory
personnel. While there no doubt is much that is irrelevant to this action contained in
such persons' personnel files, those files might reasonably be expected to yield probative
evidence of plaintiff's claims.
Avco New Idea Div., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) at 741.
174. But see Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545, 549 (D.D.C. 1983)
(denying the plaintiff's motion to compel the employer to identify relevant employees by name
and stating, "[t]he Court finds that the names of [defendant employees are not relevant to plain-
tiff's suit").
175. See Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1159 (5th Cir. 1991) ("When considering a federal
claim, federal courts apply federal common law, rather than state law, to determine the existence
and scope of a privilege."); Horizon of Hope Ministry v. Clark County, 115 F.R.D. 1, 6 (S.D.
Ohio 1986) ("However, in a federal civil rights action, federal law applies to the determination of
what evidence is privileged.").
176. See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (refusing to grant employer
privilege from producing peer review materials); Horizon of Hope Ministry, 115 F.R.D. at 6 (stat-
ing that, "[u]nder federal law, there is no privilege for personnel files").
177. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 112, 115-16 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The Miles court stated:
I am requiring defendant to show good cause for any and all confidential designations.
As revised the order shall require defendant to designate information as confidential
pending either an agreement to that effect with Plaintiff or the decision on a motion to
that effect made by defendant within ten days of such designation. This system does not
allow misuse of the confidential designation and places the burden of proving such con-
fidentiality squarely upon defendant as is required by Rule 26(c) and the First
Amendment.... To allow information to become presumptively confidential without
affording Plaintiff an opportunity to disagree with that designation and then to bear the
burden of mounting a challenge would run afoul of the basic burden-shifting approach
mandated by Rule 26(c).
Id.
178. E.g., Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming district court's
limitation on discovery of personnel files, where "[t]uming over the files ... would invade the
privacy of the other employees"). It is unclear what authority supports wholesale denial of per-
sonnel files on privacy grounds. Rule 26(c)(7) protects privacy only in the context of a "trade




proceed forthwith, apparently unconcerned with the issue of privacy in the
face of a compelling Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment claim. 7 9
The most appropriate course of action is for the court to allow the discovery
pursuant to a protective court order, drafted either by the parties' or by the
court.
179. E.g., Burka v. New York City Transit Auth., 110 F.R.D. 660, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[F-
lull disclosure [of personnel files] is most strongly warranted where a case is based on alleged
violations of federally-protected civil rights.").
180. E.g., Ladson, 164 F.R.D. at 377 n.2 ("Legitimate privacy concerns exist with regard to
personnel files. Such concerns, however, can be addressed by means short of restricting the scope
of discovery. The Court has signed a protective order.., applicable to all documents produced in
the course of this litigation that the supplying party designates 'confidential."'); Clarke v. Mellon
Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Defendant's concern
regarding the privacy interests of the employees on the document has already been met by virtue
of a Stipulated Protective Order .... The protective order is broad in its scope and limits disclo-
sure of all documents during any phase or aspect of discovery."); Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co.,
56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451, 1454 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) ("The privacy of any individual
and the confidentiality of the files may be protected by an appropriate protective order."); Flana-
gan, I I 1 F.R.D. at 48 ("The parties are free to fashion an appropriate confidentiality order" to
protect privacy rights.).
181. Miles, 154 F.R.D. at 116. Miles provides a typical protective order.
AND NOW, this 2nd day of March, 1994, after careful consideration of defendant's
Motion for Protective Order, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is
GRANTED subject to the restrictions and procedures set forth in the attached Memoran-
dum.
Confidential Documents shall be used solely for the purposes of this litigation
captioned as Miles v. Boeing, Civil Action No. 93-3063, which is currentiy pending in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and shall be
disclosed only to the following persons:
a. counsel for any party engaged in the litigation of this action and profes-
sional, clerical, secretarial and other support personnel of such counsel;
b. specifically named parties to this litigation;
c. experts retained to assist counsel for any party to this litigation;
d. witnesses in the course of deposition or at trial, in the good faith belief
of counsel that examination with respect to Confidential Document is
necessary for legitimate discovery purposes;
e. this Court and its employees, the triers of fact and court reporters tran-
scribing testimony herein (whether during the course of deposition or
trial testimony) and notarizing officers.
Prior to the disclosure of Confidential Documents to any person described in the
preceding paragraphs, counsel for Miles shall provide such person with a copy of this
Order and shall advise them that the disclosure of Confidential Documents is subject to
its terms. Confidential Documents shall be disclosed to an expert only after the expert
has signed a Commitment to Comply With and Be Bound by Confidentiality Order.
Counsel for Miles shall retain copies of the undertakings she receives from persons to
whom she provides Confidential Documents in accordance with this Order. On request
of counsel for Boeing, counsel for Miles shall certify that she has complied with the
provisions of this paragraph.
At the conclusion of the lawsuit, all Confidential Documents, including originals,
copies, abstracts or summaries thereof, shall be returned to counsel for Boeing, and no
copies thereof shall be retained by any other person; provided, however, that counsel for
Miles may keep one copy of any part of the Confidential Documents that have become
part of the official record of this litigation. Such copy shall remain subject to the terms
of this Stipulation.
In any case that Confidential Documents are furnished to a testifying or con-
sulting expert retained by counsel for Miles, counsel for Miles shall have the responsi-
bility of ensuring that all such Confidential Documents, including abstracts and summa-
ries thereof, are returned to Boeing.
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3. Charges or Complaints Filed by Employees
The Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment plaintiff often seeks to
discover whether other employees have filed charges of discrimination with
the EEOC or have filed discrimination suits in the courts. Certainly, charges or
complaints involving the same protected class and a similar adverse action are
relevant to show "general patterns of discrimination by an employer."' 82
A charge of Title VII or ADEA discrimination is filed by an aggrieved
individual with the EEOC or with a comparable state agency. 8 3 During in-
vestigation and conciliation, the EEOC must keep the charge confidential and
cannot release it,' but arguably an employer is free to release8 5 the copy
of the charge it has received from the EEOC.'86
The employer may object to producing charges of discrimination on
grounds of privacy or confidentiality.'87 Some courts have adopted a strict
rule against production of the charges because "disclosure might inhibit em-
Counsel for Miles may retain abstracts or summaries of Confidential Documents
which contain counsel's mental impressions or opinions. Such abstracts or summaries
shall, however, remain subject to the terms of this Stipulation.
Id.
182. As to the relevancy of charges, see Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park, Inc., 70 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 862 (D. Kan. 1996) (stating "identities of persons who have filed
complaints with the EEOC appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence"); Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 155 F.R.D. 537, 541 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (finding
administrative complaints filed by other employees "highly relevant to evaluate the defendant's
employment practices as a whole and provide evidence regarding intent and willfulness"); Abel v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4,
1993) (granting plaintiff's motion to compel employer's production of age discrimination charges
involving the same RIF because such charges "may well lead to discovery of admissible evidence
tending to show a pattern and practice of discrimination against older employees"); Flanagan, 111
F.R.D. at 48 (granting plaintiffs motion to compel "information regarding gender or age discrimi-
nation complaints filed.., with any governmental agency ... charging [the employer] with gen-
der or age discrimination"); Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838
(N.D. Ga. 1984) (granting plaintiff's discovery request to gather "information in order to accumu-
late statistical evidence. .. which is relevant to [the] charge of age discrimination").
As to the relevancy of complaints, see Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 48-49 (granting plaintiffs
motion to compel information "with respect to any civil action filed against [defendant] alleging
age discrimination"); Jackson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 838 (rejecting employer's argu-
ment that other age discrimination complaints filed against it were irrelevant). But see Prouty, 99
F.R.D. at 549 (denying the plaintiff's motion to compel lawsuits filed against [employer] for dis-
charge during two months of 1981 and in stating, "[tihe Court finds that issues raised in other
lawsuits are not relevant to this case"). The holding of Prouty, however, was expressly rejected in
Rodger, 155 F.R.D. at 541 n.l.
183. Title VII § 706(a)-(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)-(e) (1994); ADEA § 7(d) , 29 U.S.C. §
626(d) (1994).
184. Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(b) (1994), provides, "Charges shall not
be made public by the Commission." The Southern District of New York, in Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1213, at *13, applied this Title VII language to the EEOC's control of ADEA charges.
185. Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *13 (declining to extend the prohibition on dis-
closure "beyond the EEOC").
186. Section 706(b) of Title VII provides that the EEOC shall provide the employer a copy of
the charge "within ten days." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994). Section 7(d) of the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994), provides that the EEOC "shall promptly notify" the employer of the
charge. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1994).
187. See Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *14 (rejecting employer's argument that pro-
duction of charges would result in "undue prejudice" and holding such argument "goes to the ad-
missibility" of the charges at trial and is "not ground for objection to discovery").
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ployees from bringing such charges and employers from entering into the
conciliation process."' Other courts reject any notion of privacy. 8 9 The
middle view is to compel production of the charges, subject to a protective or-
der." Once an employee has filed a discrimination suit with a court, howev-
er, "the process becomes a public one"'' and the employer certainly cannot
object to the production of the complaints on privacy grounds. 92
B. When Production of Employment Data Becomes Unduly Burdensome or
Expensive
To avoid responding to the plaintiff's discovery requests for statistical
data, personnel files, and charges or complaints filed by other employees, the
employer cannot argue merely that the requests are burdensome.'93 As the
Tenth Circuit stated in Rich, "[i]f the information sought promises to be par-
ticularly cogent to the case, the [employer] must be required to shoulder
[some] burden."' 94 Rather, to avoid the discovery, the employer must specifi-
cally demonstrate 93 that the plaintiff's discovery requests are "unduly bur-
densome or expensive."" 9 In most cases it cannot prove such a high degree
of burden, especially where much of the data might be accessible from com-
188. E.g., Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 714, 720 (N.D. Ga.
1977); see also Prouty, 99 F.R.D. at 553 (denying plaintiff's motion to compel production of
claims filed with EEOC and other agencies because it "would be an invasion of privacy" and
"could very well inhibit other employees from bringing such charges").
189. See, e.g., Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838 (N.D.
Ga. 1984) (granting plaintiffs motion to compel production of all age discrimination charges filed
against employer); Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 710 (N.D. Ga.
1978) (ordering employer to produce information on government investigations, despite employ-
er's argument that production would discourage voluntary compliance with anti-discrimination
statutes); Gray v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 15 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1075, 1078
(D.D.C. 1975) (granting plaintiff's motion to compel production of all race discrimination charges
in the D.C. area).
190. E.g., Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 48 ("Any information discovered during the course of
these proceedings should only be utilized in connection with this litigation and not disseminated in
any manner. The parties are free to fashion an appropriate protective confidentiality order if this is
necessary."); see also supra note 181 (providing sample protective order).
191. Johnson, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 720 (granting plaintiff's motion to compel produc-
tion answer of interrogatory "as it relates to Title VII hiring discrimination suits already filed in
court").
192. Flanagan, 1 I I F.R.D. at 48-49 (ordering defendant to respond in full because "the infor-
mation sought by plaintiff is a matter of public record"); see also Jackson, 37 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) at 839 (rejecting employer's argument that age complaints and lawsuits filed against it
were privileged).
193. See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
194. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir. 1975).
195. For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania stated:
Defendant has not demonstrated an undue burden here. For one, the Court has not been
told that these records are maintained at various locations, rather than at one central
location. Even if the records are maintained at several places the Court has no evidence
to suggest that defendant and its agents cannot quickly and efficiently search the files to
uncover the necessary information.
Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176, 1179 (E.D. Pa. 1993); see
also Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 506 (N.D. Ill. 1986) ("[The
defendant] must show that the discovery requests are unduly burdensome.").
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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puters'97 and where it could produce documents in lieu of generating narra-
tive answers to interrogatories.' The employer certainly cannot claim an
undue burden where it is required to review the same material for its own case
preparation.' Nor can it claim undue burden where it has created other dis-
covery impediments for the plaintiff.2"
Thus, the courts rarely should find that the employer has proven such
undue burden or expense as to avoid otherwise relevant discovery propounded
by the plaintiff. The Tenth Circuit in Rich offered a workable solution-order
the discovery to proceed and allow the employer its attorneys fees and costs
"if the [plaintiffs discovery] effort fizzles."' '2
197. In EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp., the court justified the EEOC's request for informa-
tion on a computer filing system by stating:
[T]he EEOC, armed with the preliminary information it seeks, can frame its subsequent
requests with greater specificity and with a greater likelihood of obtaining all the person-
nel information to which it is entitled. Similarly, the ability to frame more precise re-
quests will help limit the possibility that irrelevant or unnecessary material will be pro-
duced for the EEOC to review.
EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Corp. Aero & Naval Sys., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1457, 1458
(D. Md. 1996).
198. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. In Jackson v. Alterman Foods, the court
stated:
The defendant also argues that these requests are burdensome and that, because the
burden of gleaning this information would be substantially the same on both parties, the
defendant should only be required to produce the records from which this information
may be ascertained. This Court holds that the defendant may proceed in this manner but
should the plaintiff be able to prove that the defendant could have produced this infor-
mation in a simple and reasonable manner, he is at liberty to file a motion with this
Court to recover the expenses incurred by looking through the defendant's records.
Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838 (N.D. Ga. 1984); see also
Halder v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 75 F.R.D. 657, 658 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding plaintiff's
interrogatories for various emp!oyee information to be unduly burdensome, because, "'even though
the requested information is in defendant's control, he should not be forced to engage in extensive
research and compilation').
199. Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 709-10 (N.D. Ga. 1978)
(granting plaintiff's motion to compel the employer to identify "all documents or other physical
evidence which reflect any information requested in other interrogatories" and rejecting the
employer's argument of undue burden because the employer "will likely have to review it in order
to answer the interrogatories").
200. The court in Abel granted plaintiff's motion to compel and stated:
Due to the size of the defendant and the extent to which the defendant's record-keeping
system has provided impediments to Plaintiff's obtaining discovery thus far, Plaintiff has
yet to obtain basic statistical data as to the ages of employees terminated firm-wide.
Plaintiff is consequently unable to narrow the scope of her inquiry into other charges of
age discrimination by department or time.
Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 91 Civ. 6261, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
4, 1993).
201. Rich, 522 F.2d at 343. However, a court should not punish the plaintiff simply for pro-
pounding the discovery. But see Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys. Inc., 155 F.R.D. 537, 542 (E.D.N-
.C. 1994) (denying the plaintiffs motion to compel in part and finding "it appropriate to tax the
cost of production of the above specified materials to Plaintiffs" so as to "encourage Plaintiffs to
narrowly tailor their discovery requests").
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V. THE APPROPRIATE WORKFORCE SCOPE OF PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY IN
CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION
As explained in Part IV above, the plaintiff in a Circumstantial Individual
Disparate Treatment case must discover certain workforce data in order to
bolster her prima facie case, to prove pretext, and to prove her entitlement to
various remedies. The employer often resists the discovery by claiming that
the plaintiff has requested "information regarding other discrimination claims
for unrelated facilities of a defendant employer, or even unrelated divi-
sions."2 2 The employer will interpret the plaintiff's complaint in a light most
beneficial to the employer by asserting that "unless a pattern or practice is al-
leged ... the plaintiff has not established the requisite particularity that would
justify discovery on the issue."2 3 Thus, a prudent plaintiff, although entitled
to notice pleading,2" is well advised to allege in her complaint any belief
she has as to system-wide discrimination that contributed to her own adverse
employment action.0 5
A. Similarly Situated Employees
The plaintiff is entitled to workforce discovery of "similarly situated em-
ployees,"2"u a term defined and applied inconsistently by the courts. The
term "should not be used to create arbitrary limitations on discovery," 207 and
202. Hedican & Loudon, supra note 63, at 1011.
203. Id. The article continues, "[i]n fact, defense attorneys may be able to use the particularity
provision as a vehicle for limiting the scope of discovery in general. The argument would be that
the provision states a congressional preference for tying discovery only to issues apparent in the
pleadings." Id.
204. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
205. See Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178, 182 (10th Cir. 1973) ("Nothing in
[the] charge or the pleadings suggested company-wide hiring and firing policies and practices.");
Hinton v. Entex Inc., 93 F.R.D. 336, 337 (E.D. Tex. 1981) (restricting plaintiff's scope of discov-
ery because "the Plaintiff has not made any specific factual allegations of discrimination that per-
tain to any facility of [defendant] other than the one located at Jacksonville"). Of course, such
allegations must be consistent with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in that they are "warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument" for a change in the law, "have evidentiary sup-
port" or "are likely to have evidentiary support," and are not "presented for any improper pur-
pose." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b).
206. See EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 47-48 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting
plaintiff's claim could not be adjudicated "without deciding whether she was in fact situated simi-
larly to men who were promoted"); Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1041 (2d
Cir. 1993) (presenting a comparison of "similarly situated employees"); Hicks v. Arthur, 159
F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (requiring plaintiffs to show "members of non-protected classes,
similarly situated, were treated differently than they were" in making out disparate treatment
claim); Rifkinson v. CBS Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 98, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (suggest-
ing probative comparative evidence "must relate to employees who are similarly situated to [plain-
tiff]" and noting that, "[w]hile this principle should not be used to create arbitrary limitations on
discovery, the categories suggested by [defendant] appear at this time to be reasonable"); Flanaga-
n, 111 F.R.D. at 47 (restricting discovery requests generally to "similar employees"); Jackson v.
Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 840 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (granting plaintiff's
motion to compel discovery of "potentially similarly situated employees").
The plaintiff also needs evidence regarding those supervisors and managers who made the
adverse employment decision. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
207. Rifkinson, 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 98.
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several factors must be examined to determine whether other employees are
indeed "similarly situated."
1. The Protected Class
The plaintiff usually must restrict her discovery to comparative workforce
data involving the protected class of which she is a member and upon which
her complaint is based."' Thus, if she alleges sex discrimination, she is enti-
tled to workforce data broken down by gender, but not by race or national
origin.
2. The Positions Held
The plaintiff should not be limited to a definition of "similarly situated"
that encompasses only those employees who held the same positions as she
did. First, there may very few, if any, other employees in identical jobs.2"
Second, because Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment often arises
from an employer's overall practices, broader "comparative evaluation ... is
obviously essential."2 °
The plaintiff must make some minimal showing as to why the positions
held by other employees are comparable enough to warrant discovery,2' but
this should not be a heavy burden. She should be entitled to data for all em-
208. See General Ins. Co. of Am. v. EEOC, 491 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding EEO-
C's administrative subpoena was overbroad in "demand[ing] evidence going to forms of discrimi-
nation not even charged or alleged"); Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60, 63 n.3 (D. Del.
1993) (determining that plaintiff had "correctly withdrawn his requests for information relevant to
types of discrimination other than age"); Robbins v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49,
57-58 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that where complaint alleges race and age discrimination, discovery is
limited to those protected categories); Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545,
546 (D.D.C. 1983) (refusing to allow plaintiff discovery of information pertaining to race because
fie alleged only age discrimination); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 63 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (indicating that "[w]hether [the employer] discriminates against employees on the basis of
religion, creed, gender or national origin is wholly irrelevant to his present claim"). The plaintiff's
complaint generally cannot expand upon the types of discrimination alleged in, or investigated
pursuant to, the underlying charge of discrimination. See Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431
F.2d 455, 465-67 (5th Cir. 1970).
209. E.g., Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462, 468 (5th CIr. 1969) ("The EEOC can-
not reasonably be expected to discern such discrimination by examining data relating to two indi-
viduals.").
210. Id. (affirming district court's allowance of discovery of all nonsupervisory personnel);
see also Holley v. Pansophic Sys., Inc., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 366, 368 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(stating that "[e]vidence of discrimination against women at the highest management levels ...
would lend credibility to plaintiffs' allegations of similar discrimination at the middle management
level").
211. See Nelson v. Telecable of Overland Park, 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 859, 861 (D.
Kan. 1996) (denying plaintiff's motion to compel "information about all employees, without re-
gard to their circumstances of employment which might make information about their employment
relevant to this action" because "[tihe parties ... have given no guidance" as to which employees
are similarly situated); Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (denying plaintiffs'
motion to compel employer answer to interrogatory requesting identifying data on employees in
various jobs because plaintiffs "have not demonstrated how [employees holding certain job titles
they never held] are similarly situated to them"); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 62 (noting that plaintiff
was employed by defendant "exclusively as a teacher" and had "failed to demonstrate the rele-
vance of information on job categories other than teachers").
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ployees holding equivalent ranks or grades,2 2 in the same or related depart-
ments,1 3 or performing related work." 4
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A.2 5
took the sensible and fair approach in granting the plaintiff's motion to compel
all documents regarding the employer's decision to reorganize a department. It
rejected the employer's argument that the request involved "information con-
cerning literally hundreds of employees from departments/divisions other than
Plaintiff's department/division, and did not share the same or similar title,
salary grade or duties as plaintiff. '2 6 The court considered the information
essential to the plaintiff's opportunity to prove her case: "[tihus, this Court's
refusal to compel production ... could well deprive this plaintiff of evidence
potentially helpful to her attempt to assemble such a quantum of circumstantial




3. The Adverse Employment Action Suffered
The plaintiff also should restrict her discovery to similar types of adverse
employment actions which she suffered.2 8 For example, where a plaintiff
alleges discrimination in tenure and some forms of harassment, she typically
cannot discover information on hiring, promotion, transfer, or discharge.2 9
It must be remembered, however, that many types of adverse employment
actions, most notably reductions in force (RIFs), may affect employees at all
212. Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., No. 91-5300, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 3361, at *18 (6th Cir.
Feb. 7, 1992) ("[Wie are inclined to believe that further discovery is in order. Accordingly, we
strongly suggest that the district court permit discovery of all the personnel files of grade 12 or 13
Ford employees who were promoted or transferred.").
213. See Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1993) (restricting
plaintiff's discovery to specific departments); Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 47 (restricting plaintiff's
discovery to claims employees).
214. See Rifkinson v. CBS Inc., 69 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 98, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (re-
stricting plaintiff's discovery to "employees categorized as operations producers or unit managers,
but not with respect to clerical or executive personnel" because plaintiff "was a mid-level manager
who did not perform creative, technical, 'on-air,' or executive responsibilities and did not seek
such positions"); Duncan v. Maryland, 78 F.R.D. 88, 94 (D. Md. 1978) (denying plaintiff's motion
to compel discovery of faculty employees, but allowing discovery of staff employees).
215. 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
216. Clarke, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) at 1178.
217. Id. at 1178-79; see also Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) (rejecting, at the discovery stage, employer's
argument that "statistics regarding the overall entity are meaningless where individual employment
decisions were made at a local level") (citing Coser v. Moore, 739 F.2d 746, 750 (2d. Cir. 1984)
and Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 1984)).
218. See Lute v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 59 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 394, 395
(N.D. Ind. 1992) (limiting discovery to specific terminal when plaintiff complained of sexist con-
duct by one terminal manager). In Hardrick v. Legal Services. Corp, the court denied plaintiff's
motion to compel discovery, stating:
[the motion to compel] discovery concerning the entire scope of the defendant's person-
nel practices and procedures for the entire corporation ... [is denied because there is)
no indication that plaintiff's claim in any way involves how applicants are treated, the
corporation's hiring practices, the administering of tests for hiring or promotions, the
pay rates established and how they are administered, or other practices and procedures
which are the subjects of many of the interrogatories at issue.
Hardrick v. Legal Servs. Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983).
219. E.g., Robbins v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 62 (D.N.J. 1985).
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levels and locations of the employer."' Furthermore, some employment prac-
tices are intertwined, such as promotions and seniority.22
4. The Supervisory Chain of Command
Yet another argument posited by employers in opposition to the plaintiff's
discovery of workforce data is that only those employees reporting to the same
supervisor or manager are similarly situated.222 For example, in Aramburu v.
Boeing Co.,223 the District of Kansas limited the plaintiff's discovery to "the
work histories of the thirty employees who worked under [his supervisor] at
the same time the plaintiff did," believing that "'disciplinary measures under-
taken by different supervisors may not be comparable for purposes of Title
VII analysis."' 224 The court did acknowledge that the personnel files of other
employees "may contain some information relevant to evaluating the statistics
regarding [the employer's allegedly discriminatory] attendance policies," but
found them to be "of limited or negligible value." '225
Such a restriction on the plaintiff's discovery is unjustified. Rarely does
the immediate supervisor or manager alone make such an adverse employment
decision as suspension or termination; it is far more likely that the decision is
made only after consulting other corporate officers or the human resources
department regarding written procedures or unwritten customs.226
220. See Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *1-2 (allowing company-wide discovery of
employer's demographic analysis, where employer argued that the plaintiff "was terminated as part
of a company-wide reduction in work force"); Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D.
386, 390-91 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (allowing company-wide discovery because certain decisions were
made at a central office); cf Marzano v. Computer Science Corp., 91 F.3d 497, 505 (3d Cir.
1996) (rejecting the employer's argument that its RIF was limited to only one unit, where that unit
was "independent in name only").
221. Brown v. Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 709 (N.D. Ga. 1978)
(refusing "to preclude discovery into related [employer] policies concerning promotion, seniority,
pregnancy, and testing").
222. See Duncan v. Maryland, .78 F.R.D. 88, 94 (D. Md. 1978). In Duncan, the district court
denied plaintiff's motion to compel answers to deposition questions and other discovery regarding
faculty and associate staff at other campuses. However, the court noted plaintiff's "personal com-
plaint and the examples of discrimination against others proffered by him" did not "involve prac-
tices of general scope" but, rather, "only the specific employment decision affecting him and
them." Under these circumstances, "the general pattern of decision by the person or persons who
fired plaintiff [wa]s highly probative, relevant, and discoverable." Id.
223. 885 F. Supp. 1434 (D. Kan. 1995).
224. Aramburu, 885 F. Supp. at 1442 (quoting Jones v. Gerwens, 874 F.2d 1534, 1541 (11 th
Cir. 1989)); see also Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys., Corp., 155 F.R.D. 537, 540 (E.D.N.C. 1994)
("The only similarly situated employees to Plaintiffs in this case are those ... whose employment
situations, like Plaintiffs', were supervised by the President of the State Operations Division.").
225. Arumburu, 885 F. Supp. at 1444. The court did, however, leave open the possibility for
further discovery: "At least at this point in time, the information provided by the defendant should
be sufficient for the plaintiff to make, at the very least, a preliminary determination as to...
disparate treatment in the enforcement of [defendant's] attendance policies." id.
226. See Suspension Instead of Immediate Discharge Can Solve Numerous Problems, MINNE-
SOTA EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, March 1995, at 4. ("The human resources department or upper
management can then make the decision [between discharge and lesser discipline] after careful
investigation and complete consideration of all the facts."); To Suspend or Not to Suspend: That is
the Question, PENNSYLVANIA EMPLOYMENT L. LETTER, August 1995, at 3 ("The human resources
department or senior management can then make an informed decision [between discharge and
lesser discipline] based on a complete set of facts."). Courts agree with this analysis as well. See
Kitchen v. Dial Page, Inc., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 482, 484 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (granting
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Even if the immediate supervisor does have independent authority to make
the adverse employment decision, more extensive discovery by the plaintiff
could establish a discriminatory pattern throughout the employer. The Ninth
Circuit recognized this possibility in Diaz v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph.227 The court rejected the employer's arguments for limiting discovery-
-that "promotions outside of Tucson were made by decision makers other
than the Operations Manager who made the challenged promotion decision-
,,22s and presented a compelling justification for greater discovery:
[T]he underlying purpose of statistic al information [is] to provide
otherwise unavailable indications of an employer's conscious or un-
conscious motives. [Plaintiff] contends that his employer ... engages
in a region-wide policy of discrimination. The existence of a pattern
of racial disparity in [defendant's] employment decisions would allow
for an inference about its motives. This would bolster [plaintiff's]
prima facie case and would support his contention that the articulated
reason for [defendant's] failure to promote [plaintiff] is
pretextual .... One way of reaching conclusions about an employer's
motives is by ascertaining whether the employer's explicit or implicit
policies encourage or permit discriminatory employment decisions by
its supervisory personnel.229
The plaintiff's access to such information is made all the more crucial by
Hicks' narrow definition of pretext.20 Because the plaintiff can no longer
prove pretext merely by discrediting the employer's reason, she must search
throughout the employer's records for relevant evidence from which an intent
to discriminate can be inferred.
plaintiff's motion to compel company-wide discovery in part because of human resource
manager's input regarding "the company guideline and the company standing on the decision");
Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76 F.R.D. 386, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (finding nationwide
discovery relevant where "there is some evidence that salary records are centrally held ... and
that the Atlanta facility is responsible for appointing managers of the outlying stores"); Foster v.
Boise-Cascade, Inc., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1287, 1289-90 (S.D. Tex. 1975) (noting that
"many of the hiring decisions made at the Houston plant are the result of consultation with...
[the] district manager" in St. Louis, and that "transfer of managerial personnel between
defendant's plants in Texas ... reinforce[d] the named plaintiff's contention that defendant's
employment practices operate on at least a state-wide basis").
227. 752 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1985).
228. Diaz, 752 F.2d at 1363.
229. Id. at 1363-64; see also Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502
(N.D. Ill. 1986). In Henderson, the plaintiff sued for Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treat-
ment on account of race and sought discovery regarding all employee violations of certain rules
nationwide for a five-year period. The employer argued that discovery should be limited to those
employees subject to the same hearing officer. The court rejected the employer's argument, stating
that "[Ilimiting the geographical scope of discovery ... and the time to only those investigations
conducted by [the hearing officer], attempt[s] to limit the plaintiff's cause of action and theory of
discrimination. [Defendant's] attempt, at this stage, to limit the theory of plaintiff's case and con-
sequent need for proof is improper." Id. at 507.
230. See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
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B. Geographic Scope
After determining which employees are "similarly situated" to the plain-
tiff, courts must determine the proper geographic scope of the plaintiff's
workforce discovery, as there may be similarly situated employees in many of
the employer's work sites. Two frequently cited circuit court cases have inap-
propriately narrowed the geographic scope of such workforce discovery. To
make matters worse, certain later court opinions have misconstrued the cases.
In Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC,23 the EEOC sought enforcement of
a subpoena for information regarding six of the employer's stores. The Tenth
Circuit, affirming the district court, limited the EEOC's subpoena to the store
at which the aggrieved individual had worked.23 The court justified its limi-
tation because the single store "maintain[ed] its own separate personnel re-
cords and there [were] no central employment records,"23 3 and because "[i]t
was not shown that there were any hiring or firing practices and procedures
applicable to all of the stores. ' The court essentially "permit[ted] an infer-
ence that each of the ... stores was a separate employing unit.''23.
In Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,2"6 the Fifth Circuit made
even more bold and damaging assumptions about the geographic scope of the
plaintiff's workforce discovery. The Secretary of Labor, as the plaintiff, sought
information concerning all employees terminated within a particular division
of the employer, which "would strengthen his claim by showing a pattern or
practice."237 The court, relying on McDonnell Douglas, observed that "the
type of statistical evidence ... sought through the discovery order was rele-
vant to [the plaintiff's] individual case" and that "[a] plaintiff who must shoul-
der the burden of proving that the reasons given for his discharge are pretex-
tual should not normally be denied the information necessary to establish that
claim. '238 N6netheless the court, apparently concerned that the plaintiff could
use such broad discovery to "go fishing," '39 ruled that "in the context of in-
vestigating an individual complaint the most natural focus is upon the source
of the complained of discrimination[-]the employing unit- or work unit.""
231. 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973).
232. Joslin Dry Good, 483 F.2d at 184.
233. Id. at 182.
234. Id. at 184.
235. Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added).
236. 576 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1978).
237. Westinghouse, 576 F.2d at 592.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. (citing EEOC v. Packard Elec. Div., 569 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1978)). In Packard, the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of an EEOC administrative subpoena for
"workforce breakouts" at all facilities at which charging parties worked. EEOC v. Packard Elec.
Div., 569 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1978). The district court had limited discovery to the depart-
ments in which the charging parties had worked. Id. The circuit court held:
In the context of an investigation of an individual complaint, it might well be most natu-
ral to focus on that employing unit or work unit from which came the decision of which
the individual complainant complains; within such a unit the EEOC might well need a
wide spectrum of statistical data in order to illuminate the general policies bearing on
the complaint's situation. But in the absence of some showing by the EEOC to the con-
[Vol. 74:1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION DISCOVERY
It then stated that "[t]o move beyond that focus the plaintiff and the EEOC
must show a more particularized need and relevance.2 4 '
The Joslin and Westinghouse presumptions have been cited by various
courts to unnecessarily restrict the geographic scope of discovery to a single
unit of the employer and to a single physical location.242 One clear example
of the misuse of these presumptions is Earley v. Champion International
Corp.,243 where the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of
the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of the potential age discrimination
implications of the employer's nationwide RIF. The court conceded that the
RIF "was initiated at the national level," but then relied upon the fact that
"each plant was given considerable autonomy in drawing up its own RIF mas-
ter plan."'2' The court concluded that the RIF decisions were in essence
"made locally" and ruled that "discovery on intent may be limited to the em-
ploying unit.'2 45 It rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the structure of the
RIF itself was discriminatory: "A vague possibility that loose and sweeping
discovery might turn up something suggesting that the structuring of the RIF
was discriminatorily motivated does not show particularized need and likely
relevance that would require moving discovery beyond the natural focus of the
inquiry."2" Other courts have been similarly draconian in limiting the plaint-
iff's discovery of a nationwide or region-wide adverse employment action,
believing the employer's representation that the "real decision" was made at a
lower level.247
trary, it is not immediately evident that this unit need be or is in this case the entire
facility or that an entire facility-wide workforce breakout bears on the subject matter of
these individual complaints.
Packard, 569 F.2d at 318 (citations omitted).
241. Westinghouse, 576 F.2d at 592.
242. E.g., Scales v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 925 F.2d 901, 907 (6th Cir. 1991); Earley v. Cham-
pion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1084-85 (1 1th Cir. 1990); Heward v. Western Elec. Co., 35 Fair.
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 807, 812 (10th Cir. 1984); Rodger v. Electronic Data Sys., Corp., 155
F.R.D. 537, 540 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Witten v. A.H. Smith & Co., 104 F.R.D. 398, 399 (D. Md.
1984); Prouty v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 99 F.R.D. 545, 547 (D.D.C. 1983); Hinton v.
Entex, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 336, 337 (E.D. Tex. 1981); McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53,
60 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
243. 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1990).
244. Early, 907 F.2d at 1084.
245. Id. Nonetheless the court recognized that the plaintiff was entitled to "nationwide discov-
ery on the availability of other positions with [the employer] at the time of discharge, including
documentation regarding its nationwide efforts to find jobs within the company for employees
affected by the restructuring." Id. at 1084 n.6.
246. Id. at 1085.
247. E.g., Spurling v. Philips Consumer Elec. Co., No. 3:93-cv-296 (E.D Tenn. May 9, 1995),
annotated in 4 Empl. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 684 (limiting plaintiff's discovery to
a single facility "[iun light of the defendant's representation that the actual employment decisions
affecting the plaintiff were made locally"); Cisko v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 67 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1630, 1631 (N.D. III. 1995) (limiting plaintiff's discovery to single facility
where "[tihe defendant asserts that the decision to terminate the plaintiff was made entirely at the
local level). In Cisko the court limited plaintiff's discovery "[b]ecause the plaintiff has produced
no evidence which would indicate that the decision to terminate him had its origins elsewhere, the
scope of the plaintiff's requests will be restricted to the North Chicago office." Cisko, 67 Fair.
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1631.
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There are several reasons why the Joslin and Westinghouse presumptions
should not stand, especially in light of Hicks' more onerous definition of pre-
text. First, the courts must realize that such broad, sweeping decisions as RIFs
or other restructurings typically are made, or at least approved, at a high cor-
porate level.2" The court in Finch v. Hercules, Inc.,249 took the correct ap-
proach where RIF decisions were initially made by "each individual work
unit," but were ultimately approved by a "policy compliance committee."25
That court held that "[iun light of the two-step process, discrimination could
have occurred either when the individual work unit proposed names, or when
the Committee exercised its approval power."'"
Second, so long as the plaintiff can present some colorable allegation
about plant-wide, region-wide, or nationwide discrimination, the courts should
honor her allegation to the fullest extent possible in the discovery process."
Where she contends that systemic discrimination influenced her individual
disparate treatment, she "ought to be able to work with something more than
the smallest geographical unit of the company.""
Some courts initially limit the plaintiff to the smallest unit, with the prom-
ise that she might be allowed to broaden her discovery "[a]t some future date,
if [she] is able to make more a particularized showing ...."" This is a vir-
tually empty promise. In order to determine the relevance of detailed nation-
wide or region-wide employment data, the plaintiff obviously must be allowed
nationwide or region-wide discovery as to how the employer made the rele-
vant employment decisions.255
248. See Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) (department heads identified employees for possible termination
and submitted information to the human resources department which, in turn, prepared a report for
the senior human resources counsel); Finch v. Hercules, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60, 62 (D. Del. 1993)
("To accomplish the reduction in force, defendant issued 'operational guidelines' which establi-
shed a 'Policy Compliance Committee' to 'monitor corporate downsiiing."').
249. 149 F.R.D. 60 (D. Del. 1993).
250. Finch, 149 F.R.D. at 64.
251. Id.
252. For example, the Fourth Circuit noted:
Even had [the plaintiff] limited his charge to allegations of personal discrimination or
departmental discrimination [instead of plant-wide discrimination) we would hesitate to
characterize the desired information as irrelevant and immaterial. Evidence of plant-wide
discrimination seems most relevant to a charge that a particular department adheres to a
discriminatory policy or that particular action was racially motivated.
Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32, 42 (4th Cir. 1971). But see Hinton, 93 F.R.D. at 337-38
(denying the plaintiff state-wide discovery even though the plaintiff claimed state-wide discrimina-
tion and even though the plaintiff's "argument is not without some merit").
253. Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 714, 719 (N.D. Ga. 1977)
(applying same discovery scope to class action and to a claim of Circumstantial Individual Dispa-
rate Treatment).
254. Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. at 1631; see also Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 885 F. Supp.
1434, 1444-45 (D. Kan. 1995) ("If the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration or modification dem-
onstrates that additional discovery is appropriate, the court will then determine an appropriate
discovery order.").
255. See Goeth v. Gulf Oil Corp., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1710, 1711 (S.D. Tex.
1979) ("Plaintiff may, however, serve interrogatories upon the Defendant attempting to develop
information to contradict this affidavit and show a lack of autonomy among the individual plants
insofar as employment practices are concerned."); Haykel v. G.F.L. Furniture Leasing Co., 76
F.R.D. 386, 391 (N.D. Ga. 1976) ("At a minimum, the E.E.O.C. should be entitled to conduct
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Third, limiting the plaintiff to the smallest possible work unit could well
prevent her from making a valid statistical analysis. Although "[tihere is no
minimum sample size prescribed either in federal law or in statistical theo-
11256
ry, some courts "have consistently rejected [certain] statistical samples as
too small to be meaningful."257 Thus, the courts should allow the plaintiff a
greater scope of discovery in order to generate valid statistical profiles.258
For example, in Minority Employees at NASA v. Beggs, 9 the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed a district court order limiting the plaintiff's discov-
ery in a race discrimination case to "a department at NASA Headquarters
which had fewer than ten employees during the relevant time period. ' '260 The
circuit court held that the plaintiff was entitled to discovery outside her depart-
ment to prove that NASA's reason for failing to promote her-a hiring
freeze-was pretextual. 26' The court stated that if the employer had "promot-
ed white employees without promotion potential or during the hiring freeze,
this information would be highly relevant to [the plaintiff's] claim of inten-
tional discrimination. 262 Indeed, in some cases of Circumstantial Individual
Disparate Treatment, "statistical analysis might well be the only means by
which plaintiff could prove an alleged pattern or practice of racial discrimina-
tion. 263
Fourth, even if the plaintiff chooses not to prepare a formal statistical
analysis, she still needs discovery beyond the smallest unit to assist her in
proving pretext. For example, in Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co.,
2 4
discovery so as to be in a position to controvert defendant's 'no central policy making' allega-
tion.").
256. MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054, 1058 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating "the
adequacy of numerical comparisons within small sets of data depends on the degree of certainty
the factfinder requires, as well as the type of inference the statistics are meant to demonstrate");
see also Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County, 26 F.3d 1545, 1556-57 (1 1th Cir. 1994) (discuss-
ing statistical analysis).
257. Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1451 (2d Cir. 1995).
258. See Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *18 (granting the plaintiff's motion to compel
discovery beyond her department in light of the plaintiff's allegation "that her department is too
small a sample from which to ascertain patterns in rehiring"); Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co, 111
F.R.D. 42, 46 (W.D.N.Y. 1986) (allowing discovery beyond those employees holding plaintiff's
job title because "[I]imitation of discovery to the classification of Claim Representative Group
Claims office would be tantamount to no discovery at all"). But see Prouty, 99 F.R.D. at 548
(denying the plaintiff nationwide discovery and stating that "[allthough plaintiff contends that
headquarters-wide information is needed because this case involves a headquarters-wide discharge,
the Court does not consider this sufficient evidence of a 'particularized need').
259. 723 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
260. Beggs, 723 at 962.
261. Id. at 962-63.
262. Id.
263. Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 121 (E.D. Pa. 1994). The court continued:
In order to prove any discriminatory intent, plaintiff contends that company-wide statisti-
cal evidence regarding the progress of blacks in the workforce would support his posi-
tion that [defendant] declared the labor surplus as a pretext to remove [plaintiff] from his
position because of [the plaintiff's] race, and replace him with a white employee. In-
deed .... limiting discovery to just the absorber shop, as [defendant] suggests, would be
too narrow since plaintiff has worked at several .. .jobs at the ... facility. However,
production of documents shall be limited to promotions at the ... facility.
Id.
264. Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1990).
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the Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of an age discrimination
plaintiff's motion to compel "identification of all management employees
terminated since January 1, 1983 and who were over 40 at time of termina-
tion." '265 The circuit court noted that the suit
turns on the sincerity of [the employer's] claim that [the plaintiff's]
abrasive personality justified his discharge, notwithstanding what [the
plaintiff] depicts as [the employer's] prior fickle attitude towards this
dimension of [the plaintiff's] job performance and the inability of a
company supervisor to detail instances in which such problems im-
peded productivity.26
The court concluded that discovery of "company-wide practices may reveal
patterns of discrimination against a group of employees, increasing the likeli-
hood that an employer's offered explanation for an employment decision
regarding a particular individual masks a discriminatory motive.2 67
Fifth, the Joslin and Westinghouse presumptions contain the implicit sus-
picion that a plaintiff always will overreach in the discovery process. How-
ever, many times the plaintiff does not seek the broadest discovery possi-
ble. 6  In Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,'69 a case often viewed as granting
liberal discovery, the plaintiff sought only "information [as to] ... hiring,
promotion, demotion, and layoff practices within individual departments on a
plant-wide level."27 Even if the plaintiff initially does overreach, she may be
willing to compromise with the employer for some information beyond her
own employing unit." '
Sixth, before restricting in any manner the scope of the plaintiffs discov-
ery, the courts should require substantial, corroborated evidence from the em-
ployer regarding alleged irrelevance and undue burdensomeness or expense.
265. Hollander, 895 F.2d at 84.
266. Id. at 84.
267. Id. The Eastern District of Tennessee similarly reasoned:
The plaintiff has alleged a pattern and practice of age discrimination throughout the
defendant corporation in regard to the hiring, promotion, and termination of Regional
Marketing Directors and Brokerage Managers. Clearly, the information sought by the
plaintiff would be relevant to building a statistical case. In addition, the identity of per-
sons who could have filed age discrimination claims might lead to discoverable evidence
relevant both to the plaintiffs pattern and practice claim and to her own discrimination
claim. The production of certain personnel files merely further serves these same eviden-
tiary issues.
Willis v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1451, 1454 (E.D. Tenn. 1991).
268. E.g., Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ga. 1968) ("The parties
are in agreement that the Atlanta area is a proper limitation geographically."), affd, 412 F.2d 462
(5th Cir. 1969).
269. 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
270. Rich, 522 F.2d at 343 (emphasis added).
271. Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1630 (involving plaintiff seeking personnel
charts for all employees or "[in) the alternative ... information on all employees [in specific
units]"); Flanagan, 111 F.R.D. at 47 n.2 (stating that "[ulpon completion of further discovery, the
parties may be able to agree on an appropriate alternative regional area within which to conduct
meaningful discovery"); Johnson v. Southern Ry. Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 714, 719
(N.D. Ga. 1977) (resulting in plaintiff not pursuing original request for "the employment practices
for [defendant's] entire system" and instead compromising on "the total Piedmont Division,"
which the district court found "both reasonable and justifiable").
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The courts should not simply assume that "[a]s the scope of the employees
involved in the statistical probe widens .... the burden posed on the defendant
increases and the direct relevance of the information to the plaintiff's claim
decreases." '272
As to its argument that discovery beyond the plaintiff's employing unit is
irrelevant, the employer must "demonstrate [I ... that decisions affecting the
plaintiff were made at a facility level, rather than on a centralized basis."273
Regarding the employer's claim of undue burden or expense, the district court
should not simply accept the employer's recitation that discovery of hundreds
or thousands of employees would be unduly burdensome.274 Nor should the
court presume that the distance between work units creates an undue burden
on the employer. 75 Moreover, on review, the circuit court should not strain
to find any "plausibl[e]" explanation for the district court's finding of burden-
276 Rather, the employer must introduce, at a minimum, a "detailed affidavit
demonstrating the burden connected with producing the material.2 77
VI. THE APPROPRIATE TEMPORAL SCOPE OF PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY IN
CIRCUMSTANTIAL INDIVIDUAL DISPARATE TREATMENT LITIGATION
Once the plaintiff in a Circumstantial Individual Disparate Treatment case
has determined which employees are similarly situated to her and has estab-
lished the geographical boundaries for her discovery requests, she must set a
time period for those requests.278 The plaintiff is entitled to take discovery
for each period of her employment in which she claims discrimination,279 but
272. Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1631.
273. Robbins v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 63 (D.N.J. 1985); see also Witten v.
A.H. Smith & Co., 104 F.R.D. 398, 400 (D. Md. 1984) (allowing discovery where employer failed
to submit deposition testimony and affidavits showing "that the decisions regarding the conduct of
which the plaintiff complains are made by the superintendents of each facility"). But see James v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir. 1979) (affirming limitation on the
plaintiff's "discovery to accounting/credit department" so as to "not cause the defendant to expend
an inordinate amount of time producing material that was not really relevant to the issues in the
case").
274. See Cisko, 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1631-32.
275. Mack v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 187 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989) (basing a
finding of "decentralized nature of managerial decisionmaking" by measuring distances between
employer's stores).
276. ld.'at 187 (noting that the district court "could possibly have allowed" plaintiff's compa-
ny-wide discovery, but affirming district court's denial of said discovery because it "could plau-
sibly have been viewed as 'unduly burdensome"').
277. Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *20 (ordering employer "to provide Plaintiff with
a sworn statement by a person with personal knowledge identifying which of the requested records
do not exist and explaining why their production would be unduly burdensome"); see also Flana-
gan, Il1 F.R.D. at 46 (granting in part the plaintiffs motion to compel because the employer "has
introduced no detailed affidavit demonstrating the burden connected with producing the material").
But see Earley v. Champion Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1084-85 (11 th Ci. 1990) (affirming dis-
trict court's limitation on plaintiff's discovery with no elaboration beyond--"the district court ap-
parently found this request to be unduly burdensome on defendant").
278. See Robbins v. Camden City Bd. of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49, 58 (D.N.J. 1985) (denying the
plaintiff's motion to compel answers to interrogatories which "contain[ed] no limitations as to
time," but allowing the plaintiff to "propound new interrogatories").
279. E.g., Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 471 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (allowing discovery for the
entire period during each plaintiff's tenure, where plaintiffs alleged "both discrimination in termi-
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some courts mistakenly restrict her discovery only to that period, which may
be relatively short.28 Consistent with the goals of the anti-discrimination
statutes and with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must be
able to take discovery of events both prior and subsequent to her own adverse
treatment.
A. Prior to the Adverse Employment Action
The plaintiff can use evidence of the employer's past employment practic-
es to establish pretext; those practices "may be relevant to show motive and
intent as to a present practice."28' Some plaintiffs request only one or two
years of discovery, which the courts should honor.282 Other plaintiffs require
more years of discovery, and the courts regularly should allow this greater
time scope.
Some courts err in restricting the time scope of the plaintiff's discovery to
the limitations period in which the underlying charge of discrimination must
have been filed. a Such a restriction ignores Supreme Court precedent that
"[a] discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge...
may constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding in which the
status of a current practice is at issue."2 4 Thus the courts should extend, as
needed, the time scope of discovery beyond the applicable statute of limita-
nation and discrimination during the time of their employment in the denial of the 'opportunity to
enjoy the benefits and emoluments which they had earned through their contracts of employ-
ment"'); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 62 (holding that where plaintiff alleged harassment and denial of
tenure, the entire time period of her employment was relevant); see also Abrams v. Baylor Col-
lege of Med., 805 F.2d 528, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1986) (allowing plaintiff to allege a continuing vio-
lation "[wihere the unlawful employment practice manifests itself over time, rather than as a series
of discrete acts").
280. E.g., Hardrick v. Legal Servs. Corp., 96 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983) (denying plaint-
iff's motion to compel discovery for the years 1976-1979 because "[iln this case plaintiff has
alleged disparate treatment in the terms and conditions of her employment in 1980 and 1981 and
with respect to her termination on April 1, 1981").
281. Henderson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 113 F.R.D. 502, 506 (N.D. 111. 1986); see
also Jackson v. Alterman Foods, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837, 838 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (al-
lowing discovery of prior employment practices because "the defendant's treatment of its other
employees outside of the pool of employees from which the defendant decided to fire the plaintiff
could be relevant to many of the potential issues in this case," including "a showing of pretext");
Miles v. Boeing Co., 154 F.R.D. 117, 119-20 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (granting plaintiff's motion to com-
pel discovery in the two years preceding the alleged discrimination). In Miles, the court reasoned:
[tlhis request is not overly broad and is relevant to show any change in [the employer's]
labor needs during the alleged discrimination and shortly before and after it. This evi-
dence is likely to lead to the discovery of information that [the employer's] stated reason
for rejecting plaintiff was a pretext.
Miles, 154 F.R.D. at 119-20.
282. E.g., Miles, 154 F.R.D. at 119-20 (granting plaintiff's motion to compel discovery "for a
period just over two years from the date of plaintiff's alleged discrimination"); Kenney v. Shaw
Indus., Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1501, 1502 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (allowing plaintiff discovery from Novem-
ber 1987 through June 1988); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 63 (allowing plaintiff discovery two years
prior to adverse employment action).
283. Regarding the limitations period for filing a charge, see supra note 25. For an unneces-
sarily restrictive time period for discovery, see Parrish v. Ford Motor Co., 953 F.2d 1384 (6th Cir.
1992) (restricting temporal scope to 300-day limitations period prior to plaintiff's filing of a
charge of discrimination).
284. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
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tions. ss Nor should the courts uniformly restrict the plaintiff's discovery to a
two-year period prior to the filing of the charge, for that time period affects
only the calculation of the back pay to which the plaintiff might be enti-
tled.
2 6
Of course, at some point a plaintiff's proposed time scope may become
excessive,287 and the court must set a limit. A sensible approach to drawing
temporal boundaries was offered by the Western District of Louisiana in
Cormier v. PPG Industries, Inc." The court allowed the plaintiff a five-year
period, which was "admittedly arbitrary," but which was "reasonable in the
absence of special circumstances that would warrant a longer period.""2 9 The
court explained:
If there have been any discriminatory acts within the past five (5)
years, such acts would certainly provide sufficient statistical back-
ground information in these proceedings. If there have been no acts
of discrimination in the preceding (5) years, acts which occurred prior
to that period would not appear to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.2 '
A four-to-five year period for discovery prior to the adverse employment
action is common and appropriate.29' The courts should guard against any
narrower time scope,292 in the absence of the plaintiff's agreement.
B. Subsequent to the Adverse Employment Action
The plaintiff also must discover information occurring within a reasonable
time after the adverse employment action, but she should avoid routinely seek-
285. See Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1983); Mathewson v. Na-
tional Automatic Tool Co., 807 F.2d 87, 91 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[E]vidence of earlier discriminatory
conduct by an employer that is time-barred is nevertheless entirely appropriate evidence to help
prove a timely claim based on subsequent discriminatory conduct."); Cormier v. PPG Indus., 452
F. Supp. 594, 595 (W.D. La. 1978) ("There is no question that plaintiffs are entitled to secure
discovery of acts prior to the effective date of their claims.").
286. Section 706(g)(1) of Title VII provides that "[black pay liability shall not accrue from a
date more than two years prior to the filing of a charge with the Commission." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g). In Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., the court examined the provision's legislative histo-
ry and ruled that it "in no way indicates that this damage provision was intended to limit the
scope of discovery or proof at trial." Flanagan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 111 F.R.D. 42, 47 (W.D.N.Y.
1986).
287. General Ins. Co. of Am. v. EEOC, 491 F.2d 133, 136 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that
EEOC's administrative subpoena was overbroad in "reach[ing] back in time nearly eight years").
288. 452 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. La. 1978).
289. Cormier, 452 F. Supp. at 596.
290. Id. (following Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950, 954 (N.D. Ga. 1968)).
But see Finch v. Hercules Inc., 149 F.R.D. 60 (D. Del. 1993), where the district court unneces-
sarily narrowed the Cormier approach. The court assumed that, even though the employer may
have been downsizing for a period of six years, any discrimination beyond two years created such
a "weak inference" of discrimination that it "does not warrant subjecting defendant to the necessi-
ty of searching its records." Id. at 65.
291. See Georgia Power Co., 412 F.2d at 465; Henderson, 113 F.R.D. at 507; Flanagan, 111
F.R.D. at 47-48; McClain v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 85 F.R.D. 53, 63 (E.D. Pa. 1979); cf Brown v.
Ford Motor Co., 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 708, 709 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
292. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 26 F.3d 44, 45 (6th Cir. 1994) (enforcing
EEOC administrative subpoena for "three years plus 300 days preceding" the charge).
1996]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ing information to "the present." '293 She needs access to her replacement's
personnel file to assess the requisite qualifications as part of her prima facie
case.2 94 She must examine the personnel files of similarly situated employees
and statistical workforce data in an effort to establish pretext, as in Abel v.
Merrill Lynch & Co.295 In Abel, the Southern District of New York granted
the plaintiff's motion to compel discovery of the ages of those employees
rehired after a RIF, to determine if the employer rehired "younger employ-
ees ... at the expense of older employees.9
296
Moreover, information following the adverse employment action can be
highly relevant for damages, "indicat[ing] the amount of salary the plaintiff
could have earned had she continued to be employed by defendant. g2 9 7 As
with the discovery time scope prior to the adverse action, the courts cannot
always precisely delineate the proper post-action time scope. Nonetheless they
should use their discretion to allow the plaintiff several years of discovery.
298
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court expressly adopted the Circumstantial Individual Dis-
parate Treatment theory because rarely will the plaintiff have "smoking gun"
evidence of discrimination.299 She must prove her case inferentially, by com-
paring her treatment with the treatment of similarly situated employees both in
and outside of her protected class."m According to Hicks, she must disprove
whatever legitimate, non-discriminatory reason the employer has advanced,
and, to guarantee victory, she also must prove that the real reason for her
treatment was her protected class."0 ' Obviously, she needs ample discovery
to carry this burden of proof.
Given the very nature of a circumstantial test, and the increased post-
Hicks burden of proving pretext, the courts should reject the presumption that
the plaintiff's own work unit is the only relevant source of workforce discov-
293. Spurling v. Philips Consumer Elec. Co., No. 3:93-cv-296 (E.D. Tenn. May 9, 1995),
annotated in 4 Empl. Discrimination Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 684 (disallowing interrogatories re-
garding other employees terminated in a RIF which extended to "the present" and setting a "rea-
sonable and relevant time period").
294. E.g., Clarke v. Mellon Bank, N.A., No. 92-CV-4823, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at
*7-8 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("At the very least, the information sought would have bearing on whether
the named employees were qualified for the positions which they were offered.").
295. 91 Civ. 6261 (RPP), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
296. Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213, at *18.
297. Clarke, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6680, at *8; see also Abel, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1213,
at *22 (allowing plaintiff post-RIF discovery of wage data for her grade level and the grade level
she sought for damages calculations "whether Plaintiff would have been promoted had she not
been terminated").
298. See James v. Newspaper Agency Corp, 591 F.2d 579, 582 (10th Cir. 1979) (allowing
plaintiff discovery two years following the adverse employment action of not being promoted);
Hicks, 159 F.R.D. at 471 (regarding two years after the tenure of the plaintiffs as "a reasonable
time frame in which to conduct discovery"); Willis, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1454 (three
years after); Milner v. National Sch. of Health Tech., 73 F.R.D. 628 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (two years
after); Robbins, 105 F.R.D. at 63 (two years after).
299. See supra notes 6, 9 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 206-271 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
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ery. Courts need not allow nationwide discovery in all cases, but should honor
the plaintiff's request for such discovery whenever the plaintiff has alleged a
broad-based discriminatory pattern. In doing so, they give the plaintiff a full
and fair opportunity to buttress her prima facie case, to obtain a statistically
valid sample to prove pretext, to obtain anecdotal evidence regarding pretext,
and to prove her entitlement to remedies.
In like manner, the courts should eschew any narrow restriction on the
time period for which the plaintiff seeks discovery. Events occurring years
before and years after the plaintiff's adverse employment action are relevant to
both liability and damages.
Finally, before restricting this extremely relevant workforce discovery as
unduly burdensome or expensive, the courts should require the employer to
show, through verifiable documentation, precisely the harm that it would suf-
fer in responding to the discovery.
If the courts define relevance and undue burdensomeness in this proposed
manner, which is fully consistent with the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, they indeed will fulfill the mission of the anti-dis-
crimination statutes.
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